Strategic Compromise in Contests with Two-Dimensional Policy Spaces
Luna Bellani  1, *@  , Vigile Marie Fabella  1@  
1 : University of Konstanz  -  Website
78457 Konstanz, Germany Phone: +49 (0)7531 / 88 - 0 Fax: +49 (0)7531 / 88 - 3688 -  Germany
* : Corresponding author

Policy reforms are frequently multifaceted. However in the lobbying literature most policies are taken as onedimensional.
This paper models policy reform using a political contest with endogenous policy proposals and two-dimensional policy spaces. The two dimensions give players the opportunity to trade off one factor over another to make the opposition less aggressive. As a result, players make strategic compromises in an attempt to augment their winning probability. This finding is verified empirically using a novel dataset on California legislation between 2008-2013.



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