Program > Papers by speaker > Dubois Florent

In his seminal work, Schelling (1971) shows that even preferences for
integration generate high levels of segregation. However, this theoretical
prediction does not match with decreasing levels of segregation observed
since the 1970s. We build a general equilibrium model in which preferences
depends on the number of peers and unlike individuals, but also on the
weight they attribute to living in the minority or along a sizable minority,
which we call their perception of the minority. In this framework, there
always exists a structure of the preferences for which integrated equilibria
emerge and are stable. Even when individuals are racist, there is still a level
of the perception of the minority for which integration is a stable outcome.
We then propose an econometric method to derive the structural preference
parameters of the model in the case of South Africa. Estimated preferences
provide evidences toward more integration.