Modern Family: Female Breadwinners and the Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Norms*

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November 2015

Abstract

In this paper I investigate the intergenerational transmission of gender norms. The norm I focus on is the traditional view that it is the role of the mother to look after young children and the role of the father to be the breadwinner. I develop a model of identity formation where a child's gender norm is endogenous to two main sources of socialisation: her family on the one hand, and society at large on the other. Using data from the Next Steps survey and the International Social Survey Programme, I examine the intergenerational transmission of gender norms in England when the norms of the family, and the society it is embedded in, are oppositional.

My findings indicate between-sex heterogeneity in the transmission of gender norms from parents to children. Boys raised in modern families (i.e. where the mother is the breadwinner) are less likely to develop traditional norms. However, compared to those in traditional families, girls raised in modern families are actually more likely to be traditional; in opposition to their family's but in line with society's norm. Examining further outcomes associated with gender norms, I find that girls raised in modern families are also less likely to state that being able to earn high wages is important for them, and are less likely to pursue a science degree at university level. I use my identity formation model to argue that these results can be explained by heterogeneity in preferences for conformity to the family, and present empirical evidence that indeed, girls in modern families are less conformist than those in traditional families. Using a regression discontinuity design, I further show that this weaker preference for conformity is in fact a result of the treatment of living in a modern family.

Keywords: intergenerational transmission, gender norms, gender inequality
JEL Classification: D10, J16, Z13

*I am grateful to Frank Cowell, Anders Jensen, Victoria Shevchenko, Johannes Spinnewijn and seminar participants at the LSE and the 6th ECINEQ meeting in Luxembourg for helpful suggestions and discussions. I acknowledge financial support from the Onassis Foundation.

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1 Introduction

Gender norms refer to the patterns of behavior deemed appropriate for and expected of each gender within a social community. Such norms are learned from a very young age through socialisation, i.e. through exposure to the value systems inherent in one's social context, and are typically carried over into adulthood (Epstein and Ward 2011). Socialisation starts at a very young age and prescribes appropriate behaviours for all stages of life; baby boys are often dressed in blue, while baby girls are dressed in pink; as children, boys are expected to play with action heroes and girls with dolls. In adulthood, several jobs carry a masculine or feminine label leading to occupational segregation; women tend to avoid male-dominated professions and vice-versa. Within households, the role of breadwinner is usually the man's.

In this paper I focus on the latter domain: the appropriate roles of men and women in child-drearing and supplying income for the household. I examine how family and society norms impact children's views of the appropriate division of labour within the household as they reach adulthood. In particular, I examine how successfully these norms are passed on from one generation to the next, when the norms of the family, and the society it is embedded in, are oppositional. Do children tend to adopt their family's values or the society's? Using data from England, I find between-sex heterogeneity in the transmission of gender norms from parents to children. While boys raised in modern families (i.e. where the mother is the breadwinner) are less likely to develop traditional norms, girls raised in modern families are actually more likely to do so; in opposition to their family's but in line with society's norm. By examining the gender socialisation process through a model of identity formation, I show that my results can be explained by heterogeneity in preferences for conformity to the family.

Gender norms can have far-reaching adverse consequences for the development and attainment of each sex and in adulthood, may lead to substantial between-sex inequalities in income, wealth and opportunity (Albrecht et al. 2003; Arulampalam et al. 2007; etc.). Figures 1-3 highlight some of the stark associations of norms with labour market outcomes. Figure 1 shows the relation between the gender pay gap and the prevalence of traditional gender norms across OECD countries. The figure indicates a strong positive relation between the proportion of a country's population that believes women should not work full-time, and the percentage difference in the median wage between men and women. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figures 2 and 3. They indicate a strong negative relation between the prevalence of traditional gender norms and female labour force participation, both along the extensive (Figure 2) and intensive margin (Figure 3). These stylised facts elucidate how important gender norms are to the analysis of gender inequality. Understanding their intergenerational transmission process can therefore help identify policies aimed at promoting more egalitarian social norms. In doing so, they can provide an underutilised mechanism through which to reduce gender inequality. The benefits of doing so go beyond ameliorating labour market inequalities. Promoting more equal gender norms can aid in removing barriers to human development (UNDP 2014) and mitigate the deleterious consequences of gender inequality traps (and in particular of gender gaps in education) on economic development (Dollar and Gatti 1999; Klasen 1999; Knowles et al. 2002; World Bank 2006). The modernisation of gender norms and the associated increase in female labour market participation may also act as a key mechanism to fight poverty and promote rural development, a measure that has been strongly advocated for by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (2009).

Notwhistanding the benefits from better understanding gender norms, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it sheds light on an important aspect of the gender inequality debate that is often overlooked in the inequality literature. The attention of economists is usually on other factors. Some studies simply analyse the evolution of gender inequality over time by

focusing on the dynamics of female labour force participation (Eckstein and Lifshitz 2011; Goldin 1995; Mammen and Paxson 2000; etc.). Others focus on differences in human capital (Mincer and Polachek 1974), on-the-job training (Blau and Kahn 2000), family-planning preferences (Goldin and Katz 2002), childcare subsidies (OECD 2004), etc. What is lacking, and what the present study looks to address, is the study of the 'fundamentals' of gender inequality. The proposed explanations are only proximate causes, themselves outcomes of more fundamental factors, and in particular society's underlying cultural beliefs about gender roles. For instance, Vella (1994) finds that between-sex differences in human capital investment are driven by conservative attitudes towards female labour force participation. Similarly, Fortin (2009) shows that, after controlling for the usual factors (education, fertility choices, race, marital status, religion, etc.) all of the remaining differences in the concavity of time trends between male and female labour supply are explained by gender norms. Understanding the role and propagation mechanism of these fundamentals is therefore germane to the gender inequality debate.

The study's second and most important contribution is that it is the first to formulate its conceptual and empirical framework in a way that assesses socialisation and the intergenerational transmission of gender norms *explicitly*, in a way that makes clear exactly the type of norm (modern Vs traditional) under consideration. To be precise, the approach in the literature thus far has been to investigate the effect on daughters' labour supply of either 1) the mother's stated gender norms (Farre and Vella 2013) or 2) the parents' labour supply (Del Boca et al. 2000; Fernández et al. 2004; Morrill and Morrill 2013; etc.). However, both of these approaches are problematic because they do not fully capture the norm in question. Merely asking a woman if she believes that it is acceptable for women to work and earn the same as (or more than) men does not necessarily mean that she will actually do so in practice. In other words, a non-traditional parental belief is not sufficient for a non-traditional division of labour within the family. Thus, a child growing up in a traditional family, may well have a mother who states (or even holds) modern views, but still obeys traditional rules. The result is that the child is still socialised through traditional family norms. In fact, even if women strongly believe in gender equality, it is still possible to observe traditional norms prevailing in the family's division of labour simply because the wife has a strong preference for conformity to society's norm.

A similar problem exists in the second case (of examining labour supply). Simply analysing the evolution of female labour supply (and its correlation across generations) is also not sufficient; even if female labour supply is increasing over time, it may still be the case that women work or earn less than their husbands, conforming again to a traditional intra-family division of labour. Hence, what the authors of such studies (Del Boca et al. 2000; Fernández et al. 2004; Morrill and Morrill 2013) may be describing as the transmission of modern norms may still very well be a propagation of traditional, male-breadwinner family norms. In fact, studies looking explicitly at the effect of living in a modern versus a traditional family on socialisation and the development of gender norms are absent. The only somewhat related study that correctly defines a modern family is by Bertrand et al. (2015); this paper however does not have an intergenerational approach but focuses only on between-spouse outcomes. My study looks to fill this gap in the literature.

Further, my study not only looks at whether parental gender norms are successfully transmitted to children, but also seeks to explain why or why not. In particular, it investigates the importance of underlying child preferences for conformity to both the family and society. As such, it is the first study to look at such fundamental factors affecting gender norms, and contributes to our understanding of how and why children develop norms. It also goes beyond the existing literature by investigating whether the transmission of gender norms is heterogeneous between boys and girls.

Lastly, this paper is amongst the very few to investigate norms by employing post-2000 data, and the first to do so for the case of England. This is important because most studies exploring gender

norms have relied on earlier data, which chronologically pre-date the appearance of the 'opting-out' phenomenon (Fortin 2009). This describes the slow-down, levelling-off, and in some cases even the decline of female labour force participation rates in developed countries during the mid-2000s. This is also the period in which the progression towards more modern gender role attitudes has halted (Fortin 2009). Assessing the intergenerational transmission of gender norms in this later period is therefore paramount for reaching currently relevant conclusions.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework, presenting a model of gender identity formation, while Section 4 discusses the main empirical approach. Section 5 describes the data and presents evidence on the social norm in England. Section 6 discusses the results, while Section 7 presents an alternative identification strategy (a regression discontinuity design), to examine the robustness of the main findings. Section 8 concludes.

Figure 1: Gender Norms and the Gender Gap



Notes: This figure shows, for various OECD countries, the relationship between the proportion stating that women should not work full-time (horizontal axis) and the gender gap (vertical axis). The gap is measured as the % difference between the median wage of males and females. The figure is based on data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme and OECD statistics.

Figure 2: Gender Norms and Female Labour Supply: Extensive Margin



Notes: This figure shows, for various OECD countries, the relationship between the proportion stating that women should not work full-time (horizontal axis) and female labour force participation (vertical axis). The figure is based on data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme and OECD statistics.

Figure 3: Gender Norms and Female Labour Supply: Intensive Margin



Notes: This figure shows, for various OECD countries, the relationship between the proportion stating that women should not work full-time (horizontal axis) and women's hours worked (per day) as a proportion of men's (vertical axis). The figure is based on data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme and OECD statistics.

2 Literature Review

A vast literature in sociology and social psychology exists on theories of socialisation and social identity (Epstein and Ward 2011; Lorber 1994; Lytton and Romney 1991; Tajfel 1978; etc.). While different versions of the socialisation process (or its stages) have been proposed, the consensus is that socialisation, i.e. the procedure through which individuals learn how to be functioning members of society through human interaction, is the main way cultural norms are developed, adopted and transmitted.

Though studies on the role of socialisation in the intergenerational transmission of cultural values amass the literature in other social sciences, economists have only recently begun exploring it. The seminal work bridging this gap between economics and other disciplines is that of Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2002; 2010), who translated theories of social identity into an economics framework, giving birth to what is now known as Identity Economics. Various approaches to modelling identity have ensued[1]. Among others, Bénabou and Tirole (2007) propose a model where individuals hold a range of individual beliefs that they both value and can invest in. Klor and Shayo (2010) model identity as status, while Bisin et al. (2011) introduce the concept of oppositional identities. Though the models differ, the common element in this literature is the introduction of identity considerations in a neoclassic framework, where a person's self-image is valued and becomes a crucial element of her utility function.

A burgeoning empirical literature has developed that examines the effect of culture and its transmission. However, little work exists on the intergenerational transmission of explicit gender norms. Most studies that do consider gender norms focus rather on the effect of norms on some other outcomes (predominantly labour supply), without examining how gender norms are formed in the first place. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2015) focus on the effect of traditional gender norms (defined as aversion to the wife earning more than the husband) on marriage and labour market outcomes. While they argue that this aversion is induced by gender identity norms, they do not assess how these norms are formed or transmitted intergenerationally, but simply take them as given. They show that women are less likely to work if their potential income exceeds their husband's; if they do work, women are more likely to earn less than their potential income. Moreover, families where the wife earns more face a higher likelihood of divorce and lower marriage satisfaction.

Using a different approach, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) assess family culture by studying the importance of family ties for economic behaviour. They find that stronger family ties are associated with lower female labour force participation. Their explanation is that strong family ties require an adult family member to stay home and 'manage' the family institution, with this burden falling on women, who are consequently excluded from the formal labour market. In a related paper on culture, Alesina et al. (2013) look at the historical origins of gender norms. They provide evidence for intergenerational cultural persistence, showing that attitudes towards women are more unequal among descendants of societies that practiced plough agriculture. Plough agriculture, in contrast to shifting cultivation, was much more capital intensive and therefore required brawn-intensive labour, favouring men and leading to gender-based division of labour. As a result, they find historical plough use to be negatively related with modern day attitudes towards gender inequality, female labour force participation, and female participation in politics and firm ownership. In a somewhat different setting, Fernández and Fogli (2009) examine how ancestral culture is related to fertility and labour market outcomes of second-generation American women. They find that women work more (have more children) in the cases where their country of ancestry had higher historic female labour force participation (total fertility rate).

[1]For a comprehensive survey of identity models, see Costa-Font and Cowell (2015).

Another strand of the literature looks at the relation between the labour supply of individuals and their parents. The overall findings indicate a positive association, implying that gender norms are succesfully transmitted from one generation to the next. For instance, Fernández et al. (2004) find that women are more likely to work if their mother-in-law had also worked, while Morrill and Morrill (2013) show that there is a positive relationship between mothers' and daughters' labour supply. In line with these findings, Del Boca et al. (2000) also find that women's labour supply is related to that of both their mother and mother-in-law.

Some other studies move away from labour market outcomes and analyse gender norms by exploring marital satisfaction among males. Butikofer (2013) finds marital satisfaction to be lower when a man's wife works and contributes to household income, but only for men raised in a traditional family where the mother did not work. Similar findings are reported by Bonke (2008) and Bonke and Browning (2009). This provides evidence that gender socialisation at the family level, and at a young age, is crucial in determining lifelong gender norms.

The relation between gender norms and educational outcomes has also been studied recently. For instance, Gonzales de San Roman and de la Rica Goiricelaya (2012) examine the cross-country gender gap in test scores revealed by PISA data. They find gender norms to be an important determinant; in particular, mothers' labour force participation is positively related to daughters' test performance. In a different setting, Blunch and Das (2014) show that increased access to education for girls explains much of the rise in egalitarian views towards female access to education in Bangladesh. Similarly, employing data from 157 countries, Cooray and Potrafke (2010) find conservative culture and religion to be the primary obstacle towards gender equality in education.

Last but not least, one of the few papers that investigate the relationship betweem parental and child stated[2] gender norms is that of Farre and Vella (2013). Using data on mother-child pairs, they show that children's norms are affected by the attitudes of their mothers. In line with the previous findings, they also find a positive association between boys' attitudes during childhood and their future wives' labour supply in adulthood.

While these studies shed light on the relation between culture or education and labour market outcomes, they all share one significant limitation: they do not fully capture the essence of the gender norm under consideration (for the reasons explained in the Introduction). What the literature is lacking is an explanation of *how* these beliefs are developed and propagated, and this is the gap that this paper is looking to fill by focusing on the gender socialisation process.

3 The Theoretical Framework

This section describes the process through which children develop their beliefs. Socialisation is first explained, followed by a simple model which formalises this process through a utility-maximising framework. Some theoretical predictions follow, which will be useful in interpreting the empirical results in sebsequent sections.

3.1 The socialisation process

Children develop gender norms through socialisation (Epstein and Ward 2011; etc.). Social psychology identifies two main sources of socialisation: the family (vertical socialisation) and society at large (horizontal socialisation). Children acquire norms by interacting with and observing the particular behaviours or beliefs of these two social institutions.

[2] i.e. through parents' and children's responses to survey questionnaires.

The family is of course the first point of contact of children with the outside world. As such, parents play a key role in socialisation. Parents are assumed to be altruistic towards their children, and have preferences regarding the norms their children develop. In particular, they aim to socialise their children to their own beliefs. Parents will choose how much effort to exert in order to increase the probability that vertical socialisation is succesful. Effort in this setting can manifest in two main ways. The first is by expressing their beliefs through direct discussion with their children, which requires investment in 'family time'. Effort can also be in the form of parents' actions, and in particular the role taken on by each parent. Children thereby receive signals of what the appropriate gender roles are by observing their parents' household responsibilities, and in particular who the breadwinner is and who is responsible for household production and child care.

As children grow older and start to interact with a wider social circle beyond their family, they also get exposed to what society at large deems to be the appropriate role of women. The primary sources of horizontal socialisation are the child's school, peer group, and exposure to social norms through mass media.

Each child has an idiosyncratic preference for conforming to the family and society. This preference will depend not only on individual characteristics, but also on the probability that family socialisation was succesful. Having learnt what the family and society believe to be the appropriate gender roles, the child chooses her own gender values. In doing so, the child takes into account the cost of deviating from these norms. This can be thought of as a psychological cost of interacting with others who do not share the same values or beliefs, and arises from self-image concerns, i.e. concerns about how personal beliefs will be judged by others. The stronger the preference for conformity, the higher the cost of deviating from the prescribed norms.

3.2 Formalising the socialisation process

Each child can be thought as having the following utility function[3]:

$$U = -\frac{1}{2}(1-q)(x-x_0)^2 - \frac{1}{2}q\left[c_F(p_F,Z)(x-x_F)^2 + c_S(p_F,Z)(x-x_S)^2\right] \tag{1}$$

where:

$q \in [0,1]$	is the importance of self-image to the child
$x \in [0,1]$	represents the child's choice; larger values indicate more traditional beliefs
$x_0 \in [0,1]$	is the child's belief in the absence of self-image concerns
$x_F \in [0,1]$	is the child's family norm; larger values indicate more traditional beliefs
$x_S \in [0,1]$	is society's norm; larger values indicate more traditional beliefs
$c_F \in [0,1]$	is how strongly the child wants to conform to the family
$c_S \in [0,1]$	is how strongly the child wants to conform to the society
$p_F \in [0,1]$	is the probability that family socialisation is succesful
Z	is a vector of family and child characteristics affecting preferences for conformity

The larger the distance between the child's chosen belief (x) and that of the family's (x_F) and society's (x_S), the larger is the psychological cost. This cost is increasing in the preference for conformity to the family (c_F) and society (c_S). If the child does not want to conform to institution j, where $j = \{F, S\}$, then $c_j = 0$ and so there is no cost of deviating from $j's$ norm, x_j. Moreover, the cost of deviation from either x_F or x_S depends on how much an individual cares about her self-image, q. If $q = 0$, self-image is unimportant and so there is no cost of interacting with others; the child then simply chooses x_0, some belief about gender roles that will be unnaffected by how she

[3]Subscript i for each individual has been dropped to avoid cluttering.

anticipates her beliefs to interact with those of her family and society. The resulting optimal belief is the following:

$$x^* = \underset{x}{argmax}\ U = x(q, x_0, x_F, x_S, p_F, Z) = \frac{(1-q)x_0 + q\left(c_F x_F + c_S x_S\right)}{(1-q) + q\left(c_F + c_S\right)} \tag{2}$$

3.3 Some Key Predictions

The model gives some straightforward predictions. The optimal strength of a child's belief in traditional values x^* is strictly increasing in x_j, as long as $q \neq 0$ and $c_j \neq 0$. The intuition is simple; if the child cares about her self-image and is not totally 'non-conformist', then an increase in x_j will increase the distance between the child's and $j's$ norm. To counteract this increase in the psychological cost, the rational response is to move closer to x_j by increasing x^*.

The more interesting case is the change in x^* due to a change in c_j. Consider the scenario of a stronger preference for conformity to the family (an increase in c_F)[4]. The prediction now is slightly more involved. From (2), we find:

$$\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial c_F} = \frac{(1-q)(x_F - x_0) + q c_S\left(x_F - x_S\right)}{\left[(1-q) + q\left(c_F + c_S\right)\right]^2} \tag{3}$$

Without imposing restrictions, an increase in c_F can lead to an increase, decrease, or no change in x^*. As will be shown in Section 5.1, the social norm in England regarding the role of mothers with young children is very traditional, while in the empirical framework (Section 4), the family norm I will examine will represent very modern views. Thus, without loss of generality, these norms can be modelled by setting $x_F = 0$ and $x_S = 1$. Given these restrictions, the prediction is that a stronger preference for conforming to the family's norm leads to a decrease in x^*, i.e. to a *less* traditional norm. The intuition comes from the fact that a higher value of x^* implies a more traditional belief. Given that $x_F < x_S$, the more a child wants to conform to her family's relatively more modern norm, the more she has to differentiate herself from the traditional social norm and the more she has to align herself with the modern family norm. This prediction will be useful in interpreting heterogeneity in the effect of the family norm in Section 6.3, by exploring differences in preferences for conformity to the family.

4 The Empirical Framework

My aim is to estimate $x^* = x(q, x_0, x_F, x_S, p_F, Z)$. The Next Steps survey provides data on children's gender norms through responses to the following question: "*Women should never work full-time when they have young children. Do you agree with this statement?*" Stating that a woman should *never* work full-time if she has dependent children reflects a very traditional view of gender roles; within the language of the model, this would mean $x^* = 1$. Based on this, I define the outcome variable capturing children's norms as follows:

$$Traditional\ Norm = \begin{cases} 1 & \textit{if Agree } (x^* = 1) \\ 0 & \textit{if Disagree } (x^* < 1) \end{cases}$$

As the aim is to examine the intergenerational transmission of gender norms, I have to assess how succesful vertical and horizontal gender socialisation are. Since the children in the survey are

[4] An analogous result holds for the case of an increase in preference for conformity to society.

all from England, they are all exposed to the same social norm. The variation I am interested in will therefore come from differences in family norms. Since I am particularly interested in examining the development of children's norms when the family and social norm are *oppositional* to each other, I define the family norm in a way that translates into the model as $x_F = 0$. I do so using the following definition:

$$Modern\,Family = \begin{cases} 1 & if\ Mother\ Earns\ More \\ 0 & otherwise \end{cases}$$

I thus want to find how children's gender norms are developed when living in a modern family but a traditional society (evidence on the English society's gender norm is shown in Section 5.1). To do so, I can estimate the following baseline model:

$$Pr(Traditional\,Norm)_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Modern\,Family_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

However, as I am particularly interested in testing for between-sex heterogeneity in gender socialisation, (while also accounting for a range of possible confounding factors), I will focus on the following extension of the baseline case:

$$Pr(Traditional\,Norm)_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Modern\,Family_i + \beta_2 Female_i + \beta_3 Modern\,Family_i \times Female_i + Z_i^{'}\zeta + u_i \tag{5}$$

This will be estimated using linear probability, probit and logit models to ensure that findings are robust to alternative specifications of this binary reponse model. The identifying assumption here is selection on observables, i.e. $\mathbb{E}(u_i|Modern\,Family_i, Female_i, Z_i) = 0$. While this is not a weak assumption, it is not implausible given the vast array of characteristics that Z_i will include. Nevertheless, section 7 will present another identification strategy - a regression discontinuity design - to provide stronger evidence that the findings have a causal interpretation.

5 Data

5.1 The Social Norm

What is the social norm that the children in my sample are exposed to? I answer this using information from the International Social Survey Programme which collects data internationally on a broad range of social issues. Questions on gender norms are included in the 1988, 1994, 2002 and 2012 surveys. Responses from the 2002 survey were chosen, since this is the period that coincides with the Next Steps survey, with children in the sample aged between 15-16 at the time. The ISSP 2002 contains data from a representative sample of 1,960 observations from the UK. The survey asks the following four questions on the gender norm examined in this paper:

"Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or should stay at home when they are married and..."

1. *"...have no children"*
2. *"...have a child under school age"*
3. *"...the youngest child is still in school"*
4. *"...children have left the home"*

Questions 2 and 3 address the role of women in families with dependent children, while questions 1 and 4 without dependents. Figure 4 shows the responses to each question. As shown by Figure 4a, the overwhelming majority holds egalitarian views for the case where women have no children; 88% believe that women should work full time, while nearly none (2%) state that women should stay at home. However, when the same question is asked for the case where women have children under school age (Figure 4b), responses are diametrically opposite. Now, just a mere 4% believe that women should work full-time; the majority (57%) state women should not work at all, while 39% state they should work only part-time. This huge drop from 88% to 4% is telling, and highlights that the social norm in the UK is indeed traditional. There is a strong prescription that the role of the mother is not at the workplace; instead she should reduce her labour supply in order to take care of her children. Figure 4c shows response rates for the case where the youngest child of a family is still in school. Again, I find that only a small minority (17%) believes that women should work full-time; most (76%) state that women should work part-time. Surprisingly, even when the children have left the home and hence families have no dependents (Figure 4d), the proportion of people stating that women in such a case should work full-time does not return to the level observed in the case of having no children. Although working full-time becomes again the belief of the majority (75%), it is still significantly below 88%. Overall, the evidence shows that gender norms in UK's society are very traditional when it comes to the role of mothers with young children.

Could this finding be driven by very traditionally minded males or elderly? Figure 5 breaks the responses down by the respondent's sex, and Figure 6 by age group. The results remain robust. Response rates are very similar between males and females, both in terms of absolute numbers, and in terms of the pattern of changes in response rates between each sub-question. The same holds in the case of age subgroups. While the 65+ group is more traditional than the younger cohorts, which is not surprising, the younger cohorts exhibit broadly comparable beliefs. Overall, the results confirm the finding of a traditional gender norm in UK's society, and show that it is robust to respondent sex and age heterogeneity.

Figure 4: Social Norms

(a) Women with no children should work...?



(b) Women with child under school age should work...?



(c) Women with children still in school should work...?



(d) Women whose children left home should work...?



Figure 5: Social Norms, by Sex of Respondent

(a) Women with no children should work...?



(b) Women with child under school age should work...?



(c) Women with children still in school should work...?



(d) Women whose children left home should work...?



Figure 6: Social Norms, by Age of Respondent

(a) Women with no children should work...?



(b) Women with child under school age should work...?



(c) Women with children still in school should work...?



(d) Women whose children left home should work...?



5.2 The Next Steps Survey

The data used to estimate (2) come from the Next Steps survey. Next Steps follows a nationally representative cohort of 15,500 individuals born in England in 1989-90. The first wave of data collection took place in 2004, when cohort members were attending Year 9 and were aged 13-14. The survey consists of a total of seven waves, with data collected annually between 2004-2010. This dataset is particularly suitable for analysing the intergenerational transmission of gender norms; not only does it contain rich information on an extensive range of child and family characteristics (importantly, income for each parent), but also includes specific questions on gender norms that are not commonly found in surveys. As is the case with all surveys, Next Steps suffers from unit and item non-response. As a consequence, the estimation sample is restricted to the 1,640 cohort-members for whom there is no missing information on the variables of interest.

5.3 Choice of Variables

5.3.1 Main Variables of Interest

The outcome variable of interest is 'Traditional Norm.' It is a binary variable derived from the responses to the question *"Women should never work full-time when they have young children. Do you agree with this statement?"* as explained in Section 4. Responses to this question are taken from the 2010 wave. The timing is ideal as it is asked at an age by which the socialisation of children has been completed; I thus avoid ascribing norms to possibly 'transitory' beliefs. The main independent variable will be a dummy named 'Modern Family,' as defined in Section 4. In the sample, 13.2% of children live in modern families (i.e. the mothers are the breadwinners), while 32.7% of them hold traditional gender norms. 'Modern Family' is derived from data on gross earnings of the father and mother of each child, from 2004. While data on incomes exists for years 2004-2007, the 2004 wave was chosen in order to minimise the amount of dropped observations due to item non-response.

5.3.2 Control Variables

A vast range of control variables is included in the regressions. The aim is to control for all variables that are potentially correlated with both the child expressing traditional norms and living in a modern family. A detailed list of all variables used in the regression analysis, with the associated descriptions and summary statistics, is presented in Table A.1 of the appendix. The variables can be grouped into four categories: family, child and geographical characteristics, and proxies for parental socialisation effort. In what follows I explain which variables I control for and why it is important to do so.

The family characteristics that are of immediate concern are cultural and socio-economic attributes. A key variable controlled for is parental religion. As religion(s) offer(s) various prescriptions on what the appropriate behaviour of individuals are in society, including gender roles, parents' religious views can affect not only how much mothers work and earn, but also the way parents socialise their children (Guiso et al. 2003; Lehrer 1995). Moreover, this may depend on how important religion is to the parents' way of life; more religious parents are more likely to conform to the gender roles prescribed by their belief than non-practising individuals (Guiso et al. 2003; Heineck 2004). I therefore also control for the strength of parental religiosity.

To account for family structure, I control for whether the child's parents are married. Evidence (Parker and Wang 2013) shows that marital status affects parents' beliefs about the ideal relative labour supply, which may then determine who the breadwinner is. Growing up in a 'non-conventional' family of unmarried parents may however also affect how social norms are viewed by

children, thereby affecting their preference for conformity to them. For instance, living in a 'non-conventional' family can affect the extent to which social norms (which the parents are not following) are considered desirable by the child. Indeed, a positive relation between living in 'non-conventional' families and adopting 'non-conventional' norms is found by Hognas and Carlson (2012), who show that children raised by unmarried parents have a higher likelihood of non-marital childbearing in adulthood.

Beyond parental marital status, I also account for family structure by controlling for household size. Larger households imply a higher financial burden and hence a larger likelihood that both parents are working. At the same time, larger households (and hence more siblings, household chores, etc.) to take care of may increase the need for the child's contribution to household tasks, thereby affecting the child's belief about her gender's role within the family.

Moving to parent-specific characteristics, parental age is another crucial factor that needs to be accounted for. As age increases, so does the probability that a parent is working. Moreover, due to the stylised fact of a concave earnings profile over the life cycle (Polachek 2008), earnings also increase with age for working adults. I therefore control for parental age because it directly affects the relative family labour supply and income. Moreover, family views on gender roles may also change with age (as shown by Figure 6) and thereby affect the socialisation process.

Besides age, parental education is also accounted for. Not only does it increase earnings through higher human capital (Becker 1964) but it can also affect social attitudes; higher education is associated with more liberal social views (Dee 2004; Kanazawa 2010; Stankov 2009). The same holds for social class, which I also control for. Although historically higher class status has been associated with more conservative beliefs, social class in modern times (as measured by the Goldthorpe scale using occupation types) captures job prestige and is highly correlated with education. For instance, Guiso et al. (2003) find that higher income (which is associated with social class, as this is defined by occupation) leads to more liberal views on gender equality. Thus, I expect it to have similar effects as education.

To better capture between-family income heterogeneity, I also include two further variables: the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) and the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). Both indices are defined at the Super Output Area (SOA) level. SOAs divide England into 32,482 local geographical districts - the size of a neighbourhood - and have been devised to improve the reporting of small area statistics by the UK Office of National Statistics. The IDACI measures each SOA's proportion of children under the age of 16 living in income deprived households[5]; a higher IDACI indicates higher deprivation. The IMD is a more composite measure. Besides income, it also accounts for deprivation in the following dimensions: employment, health and disability, education skills and training, barriers to housing and services, crime and living environment[6]. The most deprived SOA is given an IMD (rank) of 1, and the least deprived a rank of 32,482. In contrast to the IDACI, a higher IMD thus indicates a *less* deprived area.

Geographic characteristics may also confound my results and are therefore controlled for. The region and type of area (urban versus rural) may affect the employment opportunities and thus relative earnings of mothers. At the same time, areas may vary in how traditional or modern the prevailing local norms are. For instance, larger and more urbanised areas are usually associated with more secular and liberal views (Maneschiold and Haraldsson 2007).

Besides family and geographic characteristics, I also account for between-child heterogeneity. Research shows that ethnicity has an important effect on attitudes towards gender roles (Kane

[5]Income deprived households are those in receipt of income support, income based jobseeker's allowance or pension credit, or those in receipt of Child Tax Credit with an equivalised income below 60% of the national median before housing costs.

[6]For a more detailed explanation of each index, see Neighbourghood Renewal Unit (2004).

2000). Compared to non-whites, whites are more critical of maternal employment and consider it more harmful for young children (Dugger 1988). Ethnicity is therefore controlled for, not only because it can affect the child's beliefs about gender roles, but because it may also determine who the family breadwinner is through its effect on parents' norms (since children have the same ethnicity as their parents). Beyond ethnicity, controls are also introduced for the child's religion and the importance of religion to her life.

Further, child characteristics related to cognitive abilities may also have a confounding effect. Research relates higher intelligence to more socially liberal views (Deary et al. 2008); evidence also shows that low birth weight is associated with development delays and thereby lower intellectual capacity (Ramey et al. 1999). Since the data does not contain objective measures of innate ability, the best way to control for this possible confounder is to indirectly account for it by controlling for birth weight. Further proxies are also available in the data, such as whether the child has Special Education Needs and disabilities. All of these variables are included to control for cognitive abilities as accurately as possible.

Lastly, as I am interested in examining how successfully parents socialise their children, I account for an important determinant of success: parental effort in socialisation. While no perfect measure exists, a range of appropriate proxies available in the dataset have been selected. These are described in detail in Table A.1. These variables seek to proxy the extent to which a parent has control over, or is involved in, the child's life; the inclusion of such proxies was motivated by studies showing how parental involvement has a direct effect on children's norms (Bem 1985; Cooksey and Fondell 1996).

6 Results

6.1 Main Results

Table 1 presents the main results. The first column shows the unconditional difference in the mean probability of expressing traditional norms between children of modern and traditional families. I find evidence of intergenerational persistence of gender norms, with children in modern families being 3.2% points less likely to express traditional norms. Column (2) shows that this persistence holds regardless of the child's sex. It also reveals that females are 10.9% points less likely than boys to express traditional views, with this difference being statistically significant at the 1% level.

To investigate between-sex heterogeneity, column (3) introduces an interaction term between the type of family and the child's sex. The coefficient of this variable is not only highly statistically significant (at the 5% level), but importantly it is positive, which has interesting implications for between-group comparisons. Firstly, this result tells us that there is heterogeneity in the probability of developing traditional norms between *girls and boys living in modern families.* Girls are 6.1% points more likely than boys to state that women should not work full-time. In other words, vertical socialisation through the family is more successful for boys than girls. More intriguing however, is the comparison between *girls living in modern families and girls living in traditional families.* Girls in modern families are actually 1.9% points *more likely* to express traditional views, compared to those in traditional families. Hence, girls react to the family norm when it is in opposition to the social norm, and are more likely to adopt the latter instead, rendering vertical socialisation totally unsuccesful, if not detrimental, in this case.

One major concern is that these results may be driven by omitted variable bias. A wide range of controls is therefore introduced. The main results are shown in column (4); the full estimates of all covariates' coefficients are shown in Table A.2 of the appendix. Despite the vast amount of control variables, the previous findings cannot be explained away. If anything, the between-group comparisons are now even larger and more statistically significant. Conditional on the covariates,

girls living in modern families are still 6.1% points more likely than boys living in modern families, and 4.2% points more likely than girls living in traditional families, to develop traditional views. A notable change is in the comparison between *boys living in modern families and boys living in traditional families*. In contrast to girls, living in modern families is associated with more modern gender norms among boys. The introduction of the covariates however reduces the between-group likelihood difference from 4.2% points (column 3) to 1.9% points (column 4).

Which background characteristics are associated with developing more traditional views? Starting with family structure and parental characteristics, I find larger households to be associated with children expressing more traditional beliefs, though marital status of parents appears to be insignificant. The age of each parent is highly significant (at the 1% level), however its economic significance is negligible to have any meaningful interpretation, due to the tiny coefficient sizes.

An important characteristic proxying for culture is religion, which I also find to be a highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) determinant of children's beliefs. Moreover, the likelihood of expressing traditional norms is higher for children whose parents state religion being important to their way of life. This is in line with my expectations, as prescriptions on appropriate behaviours and social roles amass all religions. The positive relation between religiosity and traditional views is also in line with previous research (Guiso et al. 2003).

The relation between parental socio-economic characteristics and norms also confirm previous findings (Dee 2004; Kanazawa 2010; Stankov 2009). The results show that children of parents with both lower education and lower socio-economic class are more likely to develop traditional norms. Living in more deprived areas however has the opposite effect; based on the IDACI and IMD, higher local deprivation is related with a lower likelihood of traditional views[7]. This therefore highlights that parental education and socio-economic class do not relate one-to-one to the poverty level of the area a family lives in. This may be because parental characteristics have a vertical socialisation effect, but geographical characteristics do not, as they are not family-specific. Moreover, other families' education and social class may not be easily observable by children, whereas local poverty and deprivation are. Children may therefore be using their own neighbourhood deprivation level as a reference point from which to expand their aspirations window.

Beyond socio-economic characteristics, the results also reveal a strong relation between child attributes and child beliefs. Considering ethnicity first, whites have the highest likelihood of developing traditional norms, confirming earlier research findings (Dugger 1988). The only exception is the black African category, while the most conservative ethnic group appears to be the Bangladeshi. As with parental religiosity, children who state that religion is important to their way of life are more likely to develop traditional norms. Further, I also find that children with higher birth weight are less likely to develop traditional norms, giving support to the findings of Deary et al. (2009) and Ramey et al. (1999) on the positive relation between birth weight, cognitive ability and socially liberal views. This finding is also supported by the positive relation between having Special Education Needs and expressing traditional views. However, this may also be driven by the fact that the majority of SEN teachers and carers are female (Department for Education 2014), which may be affecting an SEN child's view on appropriate gender roles.

Lastly, I consider a range of controls proxying for parental socialisation effort. Overall, conditional on all the other covariates, parental effort does not seem to affect the likelihood of expressing traditional views.

[7]Note that the opposite signs of these variables' coefficients is not contradictory: a higher IDACI rank indicates a poorer area, while a higher IMD rank indicates a richer area.

6.2 Robustness checks

In this section I show that results are robust to other possible sources of confoundedness. I first address a possible concern regarding the data used to define a modern family. As explained previously, this is taken from just one wave (the first). As such, it may be affected by transitory income and hence not reflect the true earnings trajectory of the family. To account for this, the specification in column (1) of Table 2[8] introduces controls for whether the employment status of the mother and father has stayed the same over all the waves for which employment data exists (waves 1-4). The results are very stable, showing that the previous estimates were not affected by this potentially confounding factor. Albeit very small, the changes are a 0.2% point decrease in the coefficient of the modern family dummy and a 0.2% point increase in that of the interaction term. This implies a 0.2% point increase in the difference in the likelihood of expressing traditional norms between boys in modern and boys in traditional families, and between girls in modern and girls in traditional families. These changes are intuitive; the more permanent the division of income in the family is, the more permanent the family type (modern versus traditional) is and the stronger is its effect on the norm development of children through vertical socialisation.

Concerning the employment status variables themselves, I find divergent results for each parent. While a stable employment trajectory for fathers is negatively related to traditional norms (albeit only significant at the 10.5% level), the opposite holds for mothers. This between-parent heterogeneity is evidence that children do not consider the labour supply of their parents to be perfect substitutes; parental labour supply is hence not gender-neutral in children's eyes and has strong implications for the development of childrens' gender norms.

Despite these important controls, there could still be some further confounding variables not accounted for. For instance, it may be that children's gender norms are actually affected by observing parental differences in either education or job status, which can be correlated with who the breadwinner is, driving the results I am finding. To rule this out, I control for both of these factors in turn. As columns (2) and (3) show however, there is no effect on the findings of the mother having either higher education or job status; the mother being the breadwinner is still what matters. Again, estimated coefficients remain virtually unchanged.

As a further check, I re-estimate the regression after excluding the (154) cases in my sample where both parents earn zero income. These would be classified as families where the mother is not the breadwinner; the problem is that in these families, there is *neither* a male *nor* a female breadwinner. This makes gender socialisation in such families opaque as there is no breadwinner for the child to observe. Excluding these cases is my preferred specification because it makes the attempt to identify the effect of (indeed) having a female breadwinner more transparent. Column (4) shows that the estimated between-group differences are even larger when focusing on cases where socialisation takes a clear direction.

Now, what if the results are driven by the fact that in some families, one of the parents doesn't work? This would imply that what matters for socialisation may not be that the mother earns more than the father (and vice verca), but that (s)he is simply the only parent working. To test whether this is driving the results, I run the same regression on the sub-sample of children whose parents both work. As column (5) shows, results are not affected. If anything, results are even stronger (in terms of size and statistical significance) when only considering dual-earner families.

Finally, I check that my results are not affected by imposing a linear probability model. Tables A.3-A.4 and A.6-A.7 in the appendix show the results from a probit and logit specification. The estimated coefficients are nearly identical across all three approaches.

[8]For the table of results including all the coefficient estimates, see Table A.5 in the appendix.

Table 1: Main Results (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Modern Family	-0.032*	-0.035*	-0.042***	-0.019**
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Female		-0.109***	-0.138***	-0.127***
		(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Modern Family×Female			0.061**	0.061***
			(0.023)	(0.016)
Constant	0.349***	0.406***	0.400***	0.326*
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.158)
Family Characteristics				✓
Child Characteristics				✓
Parental Socialisation Effort				✓
Region Fixed Effects				✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,640
R^2	0.000	0.014	0.020	0.113

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Robustness Checks (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Modern Family	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.025**	-0.085***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Female	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.129***	-0.143***	-0.138***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Modern Family×Female	0.063***	0.063***	0.063***	0.081***	0.170***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.040)
Father Employment: Stable	-0.065	-0.065	-0.066*	0.004	-0.042
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.052)
Mother Employment: Stable	0.091**	0.091**	0.092**	0.044	-0.083
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.190)
Mother More Educated		-0.005			
		(0.007)			
Mother Higher Job Status			-0.008		
			(0.011)		
Constant	0.307	0.306	0.312*	1.439***	0.851***
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.108)	(0.217)
Family Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Child Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Parental Socialisation Effort	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,486	1,125
R^2	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.120	0.138

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Other Outcomes: Believe High Wage Important

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.025*	0.026*	0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Female	-0.047*	-0.051**	-0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Modern Family×Female	-0.069***	-0.080***	-0.084***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Family Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Child Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Parental Socialisation Effort	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.124	0.0923	0.0923

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Probit and Logit coefficients show the marginal effects.

Table 4: Other Outcomes: Want to Study Science

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.093**	0.114***	0.118***
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Female	-0.063**	-0.070***	-0.072***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Modern Family×Female	-0.179**	-0.201***	-0.195***
	(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Family Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Child Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Parental Socialisation Effort	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.208	0.151	0.151

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Probit and Logit coefficients show the marginal effects.

6.3 Other Outcomes Related to Gender Norms

As an extension, I now consider two further outcomes associated with gender norms. They are derived from the following survey questions: *"Do you agree that having a job that pays well is important?"* (asked in wave 1) and *"Would you like to study for a science degree at university?"* (asked in wave 3). Both are coded as binary variables (Yes versus No). The first question is related to gender norms because it captures how children envision their financial independence in adulthood. For example, if children have traditional norms, I expect to find boys more likely to agree that high earnings are important, due to their future role as breadwinners. Similarly, girls with traditional norms, expecting their spouses to be the breadwinner, should be placing less importance on high future earnings.

The second question is related to the well-known educational gender gap in science (and STEM subjects more generally) (OECD 2012). In fact, a significant proportion of the gender pay gap among university graduates can be attributed to gender gaps in entry into science degrees (Brown and Cororan 1997; Hunt et al. 2012; Weinberger 1999). The sciences have diachronically been considered as 'masculine' disciplines and have led to stereotypes about the appropriate degrees and thereby professions for each gender. It thus becomes important to examine whether family socialisation exacerbates this phenomenon by also propagating traditional gender norms in this dimension.

To examine the effect of family socialisation on these outcomes, I estimate in turn the following model:

$$Pr(Other\,Outcome)_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Modern\,Family_i + \gamma_2 Female_i + \gamma_3 Modern\,Family_i \times Female_i + Z_i^{'}\xi + v_i \quad (6)$$

Results are shown in Tables 3 and 4[9], and are in line with the previous findings. Focusing on the LPM results, I find that among children in modern families, girls are 6.9% points less likely than boys to state that high future wages are important. They are also 17.9% less likely to want to study science at university. The most interesting comparison however is between girls in modern and traditional families. I again find that girls in modern families are more likely to adopt traditional norms, in opposition to their family's but in line with society's norm. More specifically, they are 4.4% points less likely to believe that high wages are important, and 8.6% points less likely to want to study science, compared to girls in traditional families.

As a robustness check, Tables 3 and 4 also show results using a probit and logit specification. Findings are again robust to these alternative probability model specifications. Even though the size of each coefficient changes slightly, the conclusions do not. As with the main results, what is striking is again the fact that girls in modern families are more likely to agree with statements associated with traditional norms, compared to girls in traditional families.

6.4 Preference for Conformity to the Family's Norm

Overall, the results reveal that family socialisation is not succesful for girls in modern families. Not only are they more likely to develop traditional views compared to boys in modern families, but they are also more likely to do so relative to girls in traditional families. These findings now beg the question: why are girls brought up in modern families more likely to reject their family norm and develop traditional norms instead? One key parameter in my model that can help answer the question is the strength of the preference for conformity to the family. Section 3.3 explained how the model predicts that, when the family norm is more liberal than the social norm, a stronger preference for conformity to the family implies the development of relatively more modern norms. In the same way, a weaker preference for conformity to the family then implies less modern norms, i.e. more traditional norms, which is what I observe for girls. Could a weaker preference for conformity to the family's norm therefore explain my results? To test this prediction of the model, I run the following regression:

$$Pr(Conformity\,to\,Family)_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Modern\,Family_i + \delta_2 Female_i + \delta_3 Modern\,Family_i \times Female_i + Z_i^{'}\lambda + \eta_i \quad (7)$$

Two measures of conformity to the family are explored. The first comes from the first wave, at a point in time when children have already chosen what subjects to study at GCSE level. This is an important decision as it affects what one can then study at GCE Advanced Level, which directly affects university entrance. The particular measure I will exploit is agreement to the statement *"I chose what to study at GCSE level based on what my parents wanted."* The second is a measure of whether children argue often with their parents, and is available from the second wave. All conformity indicators are constructed as binary (Yes versus No) variables.

Tables 5 and 6 show the main results[10]. The findings support the model predictions, confirming that girls in modern families are less conformist to their family. Compared to boys in modern families, girls in modern families are 15.8% points less likely to have had their GCSEs subjects chosen by their parents and 3.3% points more likely to often argue with their parents. Compared to girls in traditional families, girls in modern families are less conformist according to each measure by 7% and 6.2% points respectively[11].

[9] Full regression coefficient estimates are shown in Tables A.8 and A.9 in the appendix.

[10] Full regression coefficient estimates are shown in Tables A.10-A.11 in the appendix.

[11] While in the case of the second measure (table 6) the coefficient of the Modern Family dummy is not individually statistically significant, I reject the null hypothesis $H_0 : \delta_1 + \delta_3 = 0$ at the 7% level (p-value 0.0658).

A possible explanation for weaker conformity among girls in modern families may be that these girls are reacting to their family's 'norm-minority' status, in the sense that they belong to the 13.2% minority of families that have a female breadwinner. While sociological research shows that all individuals have some preference to conform to the views of the majority, a meta-analysis of 148 studies on conformity concludes that females are more conforming and susceptible to social influences and norms (Eagly and Carli 1981). Hence, the reaction of these girls to their families' minority norms may just be a mechanism to align themselves closer to the majority's views regarding gender roles.

Table 5: Dependent Var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.088***	0.091***	0.092***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Modern Family×Female	-0.158***	-0.153***	-0.153***
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Family Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Child Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Parental Socialisation Effort	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.094	0.0611	0.0610

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Probit and Logit coefficients show the marginal effects.

Table 6: Dependent Var: Argue Often with Parents

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.029	0.034	0.036
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Female	0.017	0.019	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Modern Family×Female	0.033***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Family Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Child Characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Parental Socialisation Effort	✓	✓	✓
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.081	0.0573	0.0572

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Probit and Logit coefficients show the marginal effects.

7 Identification using Regression Discontinuity

The previous findings can be interpreted as causal only if we are willing to assume selection on observables. Given the vast range of control variables, this is not such a heroic assumption. A more compelling argument however can be made by reframing the empirical setting as a regression discontinuity design. This is possible because being in a modern family is a deterministic function of the relative family income earned by the mother, which thereby creates a discontinuity in the probability of treatment.

7.1 Applying the Regression Discontinuity Framework

Figure 7: Treatment as function of assignment variable



Notes: The figure shows the probability of treatment (vertical axis) above and below the cutoff. Observations are divided into bins of width 0.1. Individuals to the right of the cutoff receive the treatment of living in a modern family, while those to the left do not.

Within the RD design language, the treatment is living in a modern family, and the assignment variable is the mother's share (s_i) of family income, defined as

$$s_i = \frac{Mother's\, Income_i}{Mother's\, Income_i + Father's\, Income_i} \tag{8}$$

What I will exploit is the discontinuous jump in treatment at the 0.5 threshold of the assignment variable:

$$Pr(Treatment_i) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s_i > 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{if } s_i \leq 0.5 \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

As Figure 7 shows, this gives rise to a sharp RD setting. What I will estimate is different versions of the following model:

$$Y_i = \tau_0 + \tau_1 Treatment_i + f(s_i, \chi) + Treatment_i * f(s_i, \psi) + \varpi_i \tag{10}$$

Y_i is the outcome variable, $f(s_i, ;)$ is a polynomial function with parameter vector χ that controls for the assignment variable and ψ that controls for the interaction between the assignment variable and treatment status, and τ_1 is the causal effect on Y_i of living in a modern family. For robustness, some specifications will also include the vector of controls Z_i used in the previous analysis.

Identification of τ_1 requires local random assignment. This means that the assignment variable, as well as baseline covariates, should vary smoothly across the 0.5 cutoff. This requires individuals not being able to precisely manipulate the assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux 2010). In my setting, the share of the mother's income may, in theory, be precisely manipulated. This however would require highly flexible labour markets, where both the father and mother could choose precisely the relative income they want to receive. This presupposes that each parent can not only choose his/her exact job, working hours, terms of contract and thereby earnings, but moreover do so in relation to their partner's. In practice, this is quite difficult to achieve. There is no abundance of jobs that workers can easily choose from, and moreover choose their ideal pay among them. Partners can of course manipulate relative earnings to some extent, but to do so *precisely* would assume that labour market participation choices are totally unconstrained, which is not realistic. Hence, as long as parents cannot *precisely* choose s_i, the variation in treatment will be as good as randomly assigned in a neighbourhood close to the 0.5 cutoff (Lee and Lemieux 2010).

The benefit of using an RD design is that this assumption of imprecise control has testable implications, making the strategy's validity verifiable. To check for selective sorting close to the cutoff, I implement the McCrary (2008) test for discontinuity of the assignment variable at the cutoff. As I will be applying the RD design seperately for males and females, I run the test on each subsample. Figure 8 shows that in both cases, I cannot reject the null of no discontinuity, offering support to my identifying assumption that there is no precise manipulation of the assignment variable.

An alternative way to test the validity of the RD design is to check whether baseline covariates exhibit discontinuities across the cutoff. If treatment is randomised, these should be locally balanced on each side of the 0.5 cutoff. Given the very large number of covariates I consider, some discontinuities may be statistically significant by random chance (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Hence, as long as the proportion of statistically significant covariates is substantially small (5-10% of covariates only), this will not pose a threat to identification (Jacob and Zhu 2012). I test this by estimating (10) for each covariate seperately, substituting each element of Z_i for Y_i and not conditioning on other covariates. I do so for the female and male subsamples seperately, and for various sample sizes, where I trim in turn the outermost 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of the sample for robustness. Table 7 confirms that baseline covariates are overall balanced. For both samples of males and females, I find only a very small proportion of covariates to exhibit any discontinuity that is statistically significant, especially at the 5% or 1% level. Importantly, this holds as I symmetrically exclude more and more observations away from the cutoff. This provides further support to my identifying assumption.

Figure 8: McCrary's Test by Sex



Notes: This is the graphical output of the McCrary test, which tests the null of continuity at the threshold (vertical line) of the assignment variable. Here the test is run seperately for females and males. For females, the discontinuity estimate (log difference in height) is 0.089, with a standard deviation of 0.300. For males, the discontinuity estimate is 0.235, with a standard deviation of 0.286.

Table 7: Testing Discontinuities in Covariates

Panel A: Girls

% of outer sample trimmed	0%	1%	5%	10%	20%	40%	60%	80%
	Proportion of statistically significant covariates							
10% significance level	0	5	4	3	6	4	6	4
5% significance level	6	4	5	4	4	2	0	2
1% significance level	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Panel B: Boys

% of outer sample trimmed	0%	1%	5%	10%	20%	40%	60%	80%
	Proportion of statistically significant covariates							
10% significance level	1	5	4	4	3	3	0	0
5% significance level	7	5	5	5	5	3	7	0
1% significance level	1	3	0	1	1	0	1	4

Notes: This table shows the % of covariates that exhibit a statistically significant discontinuity (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level) at the 0.5 cutoff, from RD regressions where each covariate is treated as the dependent variable. Results are shown for the full sample as well as smaller subsamples, where observations are dropped symmetrically (trimmed) around the 0.5 cutoff in the assignment variable.

7.2 RD Main Results

Figure 9: Regression Discontinuity Graphs - Traditional Norm



Notes: The figure shows for females and males, the probability of developing a traditional norm (vertical axis) above and below the cutoff. Observations are divided into bins of width 0.1. Individuals to the right of the cutoff receive the treatment of living in a modern family, while those to the left do not.

I now describe my main results. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the share of mother's income and the probability that children express traditional norms. Each subfigure reveals a significant discontinuity around the 0.5 cutoff for both males and females. They also confirm the heterogeneity of the effect of the treatment between boys and girls. While the treatment effect is negative for boys, it is positive for girls. In other words, living in modern families makes boys less traditional, but girls more so, in opposition to their family's norm. Table 8[12] shows estimates of the size of these discontinuities, where (10) is estimated including various orders of the polynomial in the assignment variable. Results confirm that the discontinuities are statistically significant and opposite for each sex. For girls, results are robust to different specifications of $f(s_i,;)$ and to the inclusion of controls. For boys, the results are not statistically significant in the specifications which exclude controls but include second and third order polynomials. The concern here is that $f(s_i,;)$ may be misspecified, leading to biased estimates. In such cases where results are sensitive to the specification of $f(s_i,;)$, Lee and Lemieux (2010) recommend the following test to infer which specification is valid. For a sample divided over K bins, start with the lowest order polynomial and regress:

$$Y_{ik} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 Treatment_{ik} + f(s_{ik},\eta) + Treatment_{ik} * f(s_{ik},\theta) + \sum_{k=2}^{K-1} \phi_k Bin_k + \varsigma_{ik} \qquad (11)$$

Test the null that $\phi_2 = \phi_3 = ... = \phi_{K-1} = 0$, and add higher order polynomial terms until the bin dummies are not jointly statistically significant. The $i'th$ order polynomial that first renders the bins jointly insignificant from this test is the correct functional form for $f(s_i,;)$[13].

Table 9 summarises the findings from this test. They support a polynomial of first-order for males and second-order for females. Given this result, both discontinuities are statistically significant (at the 5% and 1% level respectively). This allows for a causal interpretation to the previous findings: living in a modern family makes boys adopt more modern but girls more traditional views regarding gender roles.

7.3 RD Results on Conformity

Why do girls in modern families react to their family norm and adopt a more traditional view instead? In section 6.4 I proposed an explanation for why these girls are more traditional than girls living in traditional families: they are reacting to their family's 'norm-minority' status. In other words, the treatment of living in a modern (and hence minority) family causes them to adopt views that are more aligned to the majority's. Here I exploit the RD design to test this hypothesis. Using the same approach as before, I examine whether there is a causal effect of living a modern family on conformity preferences among girls.

Figure 10 shows the relationship between the share of mother's income and the two conformity measures. In both cases, there is a large jump in the probability of each statement being true around the cutoff. Compared to those just below the cutoff, girls whose mothers have a share of family income just above 0.5 are much less likely to have chosen their GCSE subjects based on what their parents wanted, and are much more likely to argue often with them. Table 10 shows that these jumps are statistically significant, regardless of the $f(s_i,;)$ specification and the inclusion of controls, though a preference for the first-order polynomial results is recommended by the Lee and Lemieux (2010) test (table 9). My hypothesis is hence supported by these findings; the modern

[12]Full results for all RD regressions are shown in tables A.12-A.15 the appendix.

[13]Note that two dummies need to be excluded because of collinearity with both the treatment dummy and the constant.

family treatment causes girls to have a lower preference for conformity to the family. This in turn makes them adopt more traditional views regarding gender roles.

Table 8: RD Results. Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

Panel A: Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	0.133*	0.162***	0.261**	0.187**	0.208***	0.321**
	(0.0690)	(0.0481)	(0.0861)	(0.0620)	(0.0433)	(0.0996)
Controls				✓	✓	✓
1st-order polynomial	✓			✓		
2nd-order polynomial		✓			✓	
3rd-order polynomial			✓			✓
Observations	779	779	779	778	778	778
R-squared	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.168	0.168	0.170

Panel B: Males

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Modern Family	-0.119**	-0.0626	-0.0560	-0.164***	-0.160**	-0.145**
	(0.0475)	(0.0549)	(0.0463)	(0.0211)	(0.0654)	(0.0568)
Controls				✓	✓	✓
1st-order polynomial	✓			✓		
2nd-order polynomial		✓			✓	
3rd-order polynomial			✓			✓
Observations	708	708	708	708	708	708
R-squared	0.020	0.025	0.025	0.155	0.156	0.156

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9: Specification Tests for Order of Polynomial

Outcome	Appropriate Order of Polynomial	p-value
Traditional Norm (males)	1	0.925
Traditional Norm (females)	2	0.097
Parents Chose GCSE Subject (females)	1	0.841
Argue Often with Parents (females)	1	0.304

Notes: The table shows the results from applying the Lee and Lemieux (2010) test for choosing the correct order of polynomial for the assignment variable.

Figure 10: Regression Discontinuity Graphs: Conformity



Notes: The figure shows for females, the probability that children agree with each measure of conformity above and below the cutoff. The first is whether children chose what GCSE subjects to study based on what their parents wanted, and the second is whether children argue with their parents often. Observations are divided into bins of width 0.1. Individuals to the right of the cutoff receive the treatment of living in a modern family, while those to the left do not.

Table 10: RD Results. Dependent Var: Conformity Measures

Panel A: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	-0.313***	-0.356***	-0.334***	-0.305***	-0.328***	-0.382***
	(0.0296)	(0.0507)	(0.0755)	(0.0406)	(0.0944)	(0.0965)
Controls				✓	✓	✓
1st-order polynomial	✓			✓		
2nd-order polynomial		✓			✓	
3rd-order polynomial			✓			✓
Observations	779	779	779	779	779	779
R-squared	0.023	0.024	0.025	0.159	0.161	0.163

Panel B: Argue Often With Parents

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Modern Family	0.105**	0.247***	0.153**	0.147***	0.229***	0.161*
	(0.0405)	(0.0205)	(0.0514)	(0.0327)	(0.0345)	(0.0794)
Controls				✓	✓	✓
1st-order polynomial	✓			✓		
2nd-order polynomial		✓			✓	
3rd-order polynomial			✓			✓
Observations	779	779	779	779	779	779
R-squared	0.003	0.010	0.011	0.166	0.168	0.169

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8 Conclusion

This paper examined the intergenerational transmission of gender norms using data from the English Next Steps survey and the International Social Survey Programme. The particular gender norm under consideration was the traditional view that it is the role of the mother to look after young children and the role of the father to be the breadwinner. By showing evidence that the social norm in England is very traditional, this study examined the effect of living in a traditional society, but modern family (where the mother is the breadwinner) on the development of children's gender norms. Findings revealed between-sex heterogeneity in the transmission of gender norms from parents to children. While boys raised in modern families are less likely to develop traditional norms, girls raised in modern families are actually more likely to do so; in opposition to their family's but in line with society's norm. Examining further outcomes associated with gender norms, I found that girls raised in modern families are also less likely to state that being able to earn high wages is important for them, and are less likely to be interested in pursuing a science degree at university level. A theoretical model of the gender socialisation process was presented, showing how heterogeneity in preferences for conformity to the family can explain my findings. Evidence was presented supporting this theoretical prediction. A regression discontinuity framework was then used to show that these findings are causal: the treatment of living in a modern family causes boys to adopt more modern norms but girls to adopt more traditional norms. The treatment also made girls less conformist to the family, which explains why they are more likely to adopt the social norm instead.

The study reveals that horizontal socialisation is very important for the development of girls' gender norms. In fact, it is so strong that it leads to 'reactionary' behaviour by girls when their family violates the traditional social norm. If we are interested in reducing gender inequalities by promoting more modern gender norms, we must therefore focus on changing the social norm. Teenage girls get exposed to social norms through the mass media and through schools. Policy must therefore address how gender norms are portrayed in the media, but more importantly must focus on the role of schools and teachers in transmitting social norms to children. Initiatives must be taken to promote gender equality through the school system. Moreover, a critical assessment of the role of single-sex schools, and single-sex classes in otherwise mixed schools, is necessary. While advocates argue that such arrangements protect girls from being victims of gender stereotypes and traditional norms (Kessels and Hannover 2010), their very existence may be achieving just that - by legitimising the view that boys and girls are inherently unequal.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Description	Mean	St. Dev.
Main Variables of Interest			
Modern Family	1 if mother earns more than father	0.132	0.338
Traditional Norm	1 if child believes women with young children should never work full-time	0.327	0.469
High Wage Important	1 if child believes earning a high wage is important	0.651	0.477
Study Science	1 if child wants to pursue a science degree at university level	0.416	0.493
Family Chose GCSEs	1 if the child's family chose what she will study at GCSE level	0.375	0.484
Family Chose Uni Studies	1 if the child's family chose what she will study at university	0.164	0.371
Argue Often with Parents	1 if child argues with parents at least once a week	0.596	0.491
Family Characteristics			
Parents not Married	1 if child's parents are not married	0.055	0.229
Household Size	No. of people in child's household	4.711	1.249
Father's Age	Male parent's age in years	43.176	5.916
Mother's Age	Female parent's age in years	44.480	6.374
Religion Important to Parents	1 if any parent states that religion is important to family's way of life	0.607	0.489
Father's Religion: Christian	1 if father is Christian	0.792	0.406
Father's Religion: Muslim	1 if father is Muslim	0.132	0.338
Father's Religion: Minority	1 if father is Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Atheist	0.070	0.255
Mother's Religion: Christian	1 if mother is Christian	0.693	0.461
Mother's Religion: Muslim	1 if mother is Muslim	0.133	0.340
Mother's Religion: Minority	1 if mother is Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Atheist	0.168	0.374
Family Education: Degree	1 if highest education between parents is university degree level or higher	0.229	0.420
Family Education: Below Degree	1 if highest education between parents is higher education below degree level	0.187	0.390
Family Education: GCE A Level	1 if highest education between parents is GCE A Level or equivalent	0.195	0.396
Family Education: GCSE	1 if highest education between parents is GCSE level grades A-C, or equivalent	0.232	0.422
Family Education: Level 1	1 if highest education between parents is at level 1 or below	0.038	0.191
Family Education: Other	1 if highest education between parents is informal/undefined	0.010	0.098
Family Education: None	1 if neither parent has any education qualifications	0.110	0.313
Father's Social Class: Higher Mang.	1 if father's occupation is 'Higher Managerial or Professional'	0.073	0.260
Father's Social Class: Lower Mang.	1 if father's occupation is 'Lower Managerial or Professional'	0.276	0.447
Father's Social Class: Intermediate	1 if father's occupation is 'Intermediate'	0.165	0.371
Father's Social Class: Small Employer	1 if father's occupation is 'Small Employer/Own Accounts Worker'	0.040	0.195
Father's Social Class: Lower Supervisor	1 if father's occupation is 'Lower Supervisory/Technical'	0.084	0.278
Father's Social Class: Semi-Routine	1 if father's occupation is 'Semi-Routine'	0.196	0.397
Father's Social Class: Routine	1 if father's occupation is 'Routine'	0.100	0.300
Father's Social Class: Long-Term u/e	1 if father is long-term unemployed/never worked	0.066	0.249
Mother's Social Class: Higher Mang.	1 if mother's occupation is 'Higher Managerial or Professional'	0.161	0.368

Mother's Social Class: Lower Mang.	1 if mother's occupation is 'Lower Managerial or Professional'	0.235	0.424
Mother's Social Class: Intermediate	1 if mother's occupation is 'Intermediate'	0.071	0.256
Mother's Social Class: Small Employer	1 if mother's occupation is 'Small Employer/Own Accounts Worker'	0.080	0.271
Mother's Social Class: Lower Supervisor	1 if mother's occupation is 'Lower Supervisory/Technical'	0.136	0.343
Mother's Social Class: Semi-Routine	1 if mother's occupation is 'Semi-Routine'	0.100	0.300
Mother's Social Class: Routine	1 if mother's occupation is 'Routine'	0.121	0.326
Mother's Social Class: Long-Term u/e	1 if mother is long-term unemployed/never worked	0.097	0.296
IDACI score	Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index, defined at super output area. range: 0-1	0.189	0.170
IMD Rank	Index of Multiple Deprivation rank, defined at local super output area. range: 1-32,482	21.579	16.588
Mother More Educated	1 if mother has higher level of education than father	0.278	0.448
Mother Higher Job Status	1 if mother has higher job status level than father (defined by occupation type)	0.494	0.500
Father Employment Stable	1 if father did not change employment status between waves 1-4	0.987	0.112
Mother Employment Stable	1 if mother did not change employment status between waves 1-4	0.991	0.095
Mother Work after Birth	1 if mother returned to full-time work after giving birth to child	0.333	0.471
Child Characteristics			
Child Sex	1 if female	0.520	0.500
Child Ethnicity: White	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is white	0.750	0.433
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is mixed	0.022	0.147
Child Ethnicity: Indian	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is indian	0.073	0.260
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is pakistani	0.068	0.251
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is bangladeshi	0.040	0.197
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is black caribbean	0.010	0.098
Child Ethnicity: Black African	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is black african	0.014	0.118
Child Ethnicity: Other	1 if child's (and hence parents') ethnicity is none of above	0.023	0.150
Religion Important to Child	1 if child states that religion is important to her way of life	0.212	0.409
Child Religion: Christian	1 if child is Christian	0.745	0.436
Child Religion: Muslim	1 if child is Muslim	0.133	0.340
Child Religion: Minority	1 if child is Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Atheist	0.118	0.322
Birth Weight	Child's birth weight in kgs	3.299	0.595
SEN	1 if child has Special Education Needs	0.137	0.343
Disability	1 if child has a known disability	0.029	0.167
Parental Socialisation Effort			
Family Evenings: Often	1 if parents spend evenings with child, at least 3 times per month	0.943	0.232
Family Evenings: Sometimes	1 if parents spend evenings with child, once per month or less	0.028	0.165
Family Evenings: Never	1 if parents never spend evenings with child	0.029	0.169
Curfew: Always	1 if parents always set curfew for child	0.965	0.185
Curfew: Rarely	1 if parents rarely (or never) set curfew for child	0.057	0.231
Family Activities: Often	1 if go out together as family, at least 3 times per month	0.896	0.306
Family Activities: Sometimes	1 if go out together as family, once per month or less	0.083	0.277
Family Activities: Never	1 if never go out together as family	0.021	0.142
Talk about School: Often	1 if parents frequently talk to child about school day	0.473	0.499
Talk about School: Rarely	1 if parents rarely (or never) talk to child about school day	0.527	0.499
Geographic Characteristics			
Region: North East	1 if child lives in North East	0.062	0.240

Region: North West	1 if child lives in North West	0.151	0.358
Region: Yorkshire and The Humber	1 if child lives in Yorkshire and The Humber	0.108	0.311
Region: East Midlands	1 if child lives in East Midlands	0.092	0.289
Region: West Midlands	1 if child lives in West Midlands	0.140	0.347
Region: East of England	1 if child lives in East of England	0.099	0.298
Region: London	1 if child lives in London	0.116	0.320
Region: South East	1 if child lives in South East	0.147	0.355
Region: South West	1 if child lives in South West	0.085	0.279
Area: Sparce Urban	1 if child lives in sparce urban area	0.001	0.025
Area: Sparce Town and Fringe	1 if child lives in sparce town and fringe area	0.006	0.078
Area: Sparce Village	1 if child lives in sparce village	0.005	0.070
Area: Sparce Hamlet and Isolated Dwelling	1 if child lives in sparce hamlet and isolated dwelling	0.005	0.074
Area: Urban	1 if child lives in urban area	0.800	0.400
Area: Town and Fringe	1 if child lives in town and fringe area	0.083	0.277
Area: Village	1 if child lives in village	0.077	0.266
Area: Hamlet and Isolated Dwelling	1 if child lives in hamlet and isolated dwelling	0.023	0.150

Table A.2: Main Results (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Modern Family	-0.032*	-0.035*	-0.042***	-0.019**
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Female		-0.109***	-0.138***	-0.127***
		(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Modern Family×Female			0.061**	0.061***
			(0.023)	(0.016)
Parents not Married				0.009
				(0.022)
Household Size				0.013*
				(0.006)
Father Age				0.004***
				(0.001)
Mother Age				-0.003**
				(0.001)
Religion Important to Parents				0.038***
				(0.009)
Father Religion: Muslim				-0.103***
				(0.025)
Father Religion: Minority				0.397***
				(0.055)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.130***
				(0.031)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.148***
				(0.007)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.006
				(0.015)
Family Education: GCE A Level				-0.001
				(0.017)
Family Education: GCSE				0.031
				(0.033)
Family Education: Level 1				0.090
				(0.049)
Family Education: Other				0.156***
				(0.024)
Family Education: None				0.019
				(0.039)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.029
				(0.027)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.044*
				(0.020)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				0.116***
				(0.025)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.054
				(0.034)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.133***

Table A.2: Main Results (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
				(0.011)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.154***
				(0.031)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.221***
				(0.026)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.026*
				(0.014)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.062***
				(0.012)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.094***
				(0.023)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.043**
				(0.016)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.071**
				(0.026)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.070**
				(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.110***
				(0.023)
IDACI score				-0.413**
				(0.128)
IMD rank				0.004**
				(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				-0.080**
				(0.028)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.281***
				(0.040)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.171***
				(0.038)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.284***
				(0.034)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.180***
				(0.004)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.077***
				(0.018)
Child Ethnicity: Other				-0.003
				(0.035)
Religion Important to Child				0.079***
				(0.013)
Child Religion: Muslim				0.060
				(0.047)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.030
				(0.060)
Child Birth Weight				-0.021*
				(0.009)

Table A.2: Main Results (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child has SEN statement				0.063**
				(0.020)
Child has Disability				0.050
				(0.030)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.010
				(0.056)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.126
				(0.068)
Curfew: Always				0.103
				(0.058)
Family Evenings: Often				0.016
				(0.073)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				0.046
				(0.068)
Talk About School: Often				-0.007
				(0.011)
Constant	0.349***	0.406***	0.400***	0.326*
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.158)
Region Fixed Effects				✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,640
R^2	0.000	0.014	0.020	0.113

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.3: Main Results (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Modern Family	-0.032*	-0.036**	-0.039***	-0.016***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Female		-0.109***	-0.138***	-0.137***
		(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Modern Family×Female			0.062**	0.062***
			(0.026)	(0.018)
Parents not Married				0.015
				(0.022)
Household Size				0.013**
				(0.006)
Father Age				0.004***
				(0.001)
Mother Age				-0.003**
				(0.001)
Religion Important to Parents				0.042***
				(0.009)
Father Religion: Muslim				-0.098***
				(0.018)
Father Religion: Minority				0.461***
				(0.053)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.094***
				(0.035)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.167***
				(0.012)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.011
				(0.018)
Family Education: GCE A Level				-0.001
				(0.019)
Family Education: GCSE				0.033
				(0.035)
Family Education: Level 1				0.090*
				(0.053)
Family Education: Other				0.170***
				(0.026)
Family Education: None				0.015
				(0.040)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.033
				(0.031)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.048**
				(0.021)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				0.137***
				(0.025)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.061
				(0.037)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.150***

Table A.3: Main Results (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
				(0.011)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.175***
				(0.032)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.245***
				(0.028)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.034**
				(0.017)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.075***
				(0.015)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.113***
				(0.024)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.051***
				(0.019)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.081***
				(0.030)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.083***
				(0.024)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.123***
				(0.022)
IDACI score				-0.440***
				(0.137)
IMD rank				0.005***
				(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				-0.086***
				(0.027)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.226***
				(0.024)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.157***
				(0.028)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.223***
				(0.017)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.206***
				(0.002)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.066***
				(0.020)
Child Ethnicity: Other				-0.001
				(0.032)
Religion Important to Child				0.082***
				(0.013)
Child Religion: Muslim				0.100*
				(0.057)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.033
				(0.067)
Child Birth Weight				-0.023**
				(0.010)

Table A.3: Main Results (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child has SEN statement				0.067***
				(0.020)
Child has Disability				0.053
				(0.032)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.019
				(0.054)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.137***
				(0.051)
Curfew: Always				0.099**
				(0.049)
Family Evenings: Often				0.015
				(0.069)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				0.043
				(0.067)
Talk About School: Often				-0.008
				(0.011)
Region Fixed Effects				✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,640
Pseudo-R^2	0.000392	0.0107	0.0155	0.0850

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.4: Main Results (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Modern Family	-0.032*	-0.035**	-0.038***	-0.016***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Female		-0.109***	-0.138***	-0.136***
		(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Modern Family×Female			0.063**	0.064***
			(0.027)	(0.019)
Parents not Married				0.012
				(0.023)
Household Size				0.012**
				(0.006)
Father Age				0.004***
				(0.001)
Mother Age				-0.003**
				(0.001)
Religion Important to Parents				0.041***
				(0.009)
Father Religion: Muslim				-0.087***
				(0.018)
Father Religion: Minority				0.476***
				(0.053)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.098***
				(0.031)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.166***
				(0.010)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.007
				(0.018)
Family Education: GCE A Level				0.000
				(0.021)
Family Education: GCSE				0.035
				(0.037)
Family Education: Level 1				0.092*
				(0.054)
Family Education: Other				0.171***
				(0.028)
Family Education: None				0.018
				(0.042)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.034
				(0.030)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.050**
				(0.023)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				0.138***
				(0.026)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.065*
				(0.038)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.155***

Table A.4: Main Results (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
				(0.012)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.175***
				(0.035)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.249***
				(0.028)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.033*
				(0.018)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.079***
				(0.016)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.113***
				(0.024)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.053***
				(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.083***
				(0.031)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.083***
				(0.026)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.124***
				(0.022)
IDACI score				-0.434***
				(0.135)
IMD rank				0.005***
				(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				-0.088***
				(0.028)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.217***
				(0.023)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.152***
				(0.029)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.212***
				(0.018)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.190***
				(0.002)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.068***
				(0.019)
Child Ethnicity: Other				-0.007
				(0.033)
Religion Important to Child				0.083***
				(0.012)
Child Religion: Muslim				0.093
				(0.057)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.036
				(0.070)
Child Birth Weight				-0.020**
				(0.010)

Table A.4: Main Results (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child has SEN statement				0.069***
				(0.021)
Child has Disability				0.053
				(0.033)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.017
				(0.055)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.134***
				(0.049)
Curfew: Always				0.096**
				(0.048)
Family Evenings: Often				0.014
				(0.071)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				0.045
				(0.071)
Talk About School: Often				-0.008
				(0.011)
Region Fixed Effects				✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,640
Pseudo-R^2	0.000392	0.0107	0.0155	0.0848

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.5: Robustness Checks (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Modern Family	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.025**	-0.085***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Female	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.129***	-0.143***	-0.138***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Modern Family×Female	0.063***	0.063***	0.063***	0.081***	0.170***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.040)
Father Employment: Stable	-0.065	-0.065	-0.066*	0.004	-0.042
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.052)
Mother Employment: Stable	0.091**	0.091**	0.092**	0.044	-0.083
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.190)
Mother More Educated		-0.005			
		(0.007)			
Mother Higher Job Status			-0.008		
			(0.011)		
Parents not Married	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.018	0.062**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Household Size	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.018*	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Father Age	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.002***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother Age	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents	0.037***	0.038***	0.037***	0.053***	0.050***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Father Religion: Muslim	-0.102***	-0.102***	-0.100***	-0.124***	-0.481***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.091)
Father Religion: Minority	0.401***	0.401***	0.403***	0.386***	0.382***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.023)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.128***	0.129***	0.127***	0.149***	0.343***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.066)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.150***	-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.152***	-0.135***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.020)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.027
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.028)
Family Education: GCE A Level	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.004	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Family Education: GCSE	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.029	0.045*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Family Education: Level 1	0.089	0.090	0.089	0.056	0.090
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.064)
Family Education: Other	0.155***	0.156***	0.153***	0.214***	0.498***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.132)
Family Education: None	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.001	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.040)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.027	0.027	0.026	0.020	-0.052**

Table A.5: Robustness Checks (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	0.043*	0.043*	0.041*	0.041	-0.037
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.112***	0.112***	0.111***	0.110***	0.045
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.044)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.053	0.053	0.051	0.056	-0.044
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.049)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.131***	0.131***	0.127***	0.140***	0.097***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.152***	0.152***	0.149***	0.161***	0.124*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.058)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.219***	0.219***	0.217***	0.132***	
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.015)	
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.027*	0.028*	0.030	0.028	0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	0.062***	0.062***	0.065***	0.060**	0.103***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	0.094***	0.095***	0.097***	0.119***	0.114**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.042**	0.043**	0.046**	0.025	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.075**	0.076**	0.079**	0.076*	0.067*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.072***	0.073***	0.078***	0.081**	0.125**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.045)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.112***	0.113***	0.116***	0.021	
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.035)	
IDACI score	-0.421**	-0.422**	-0.422**	-0.706***	-0.809***
	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.166)
IMD rank	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.007***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	-0.080**	-0.080**	-0.080**	-0.051***	-0.060***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	-0.282***	-0.283***	-0.284***	-0.282***	-0.237***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.040)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	-0.173***	-0.174***	-0.175***	-0.128***	0.359***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.071)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	-0.288***	-0.288***	-0.290***	-0.234***	-0.144***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.028)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	-0.180***	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.193***	-0.169***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.077***	0.076***	0.075***	0.118***	0.095***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.009)
Child Ethnicity: Other	-0.004	-0.004	-0.006	-0.017	-0.070*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.032)

Table A.5: Robustness Checks (LPM). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religion Important to Child	0.079***	0.079***	0.079***	0.082***	0.042
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Child Religion: Muslim	0.064	0.063	0.064	0.032	
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.038)	
Child Religion: Minority	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028	-0.022	-0.051**
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.019)
Child Birth Weight	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.009	-0.017
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Child has SEN statement	0.063**	0.063**	0.063**	0.083***	0.071**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Child has Disability	0.051	0.052	0.052	0.007	0.042
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.012	-0.017
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.071)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.127	-0.126	-0.126	-0.138	-0.113
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.079)
Curfew: Always	0.103	0.103	0.102	0.111	0.121
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.113)
Family Evenings: Often	0.014	0.014	0.012	0.016	0.127
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.105)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.045	0.045	0.044	0.061	0.140
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.098)
Talk About School: Often	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Constant	0.307	0.306	0.312*	1.439***	0.851***
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.108)	(0.217)
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,486	1,125
R^2	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.120	0.138

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.6: Robustness Checks (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Modern Family	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.016***	-0.023***	-0.080***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.018)
Female	-0.139***	-0.138***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.152***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Modern Family×Female	0.065***	0.065***	0.066***	0.084***	0.205***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.051)
Father Employment: Stable	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.080**	-0.004	-0.058
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.052)
Mother Employment: Stable	0.102***	0.102***	0.103***	0.057	-0.069
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.243)
Mother More Educated		-0.003			
		(0.008)			
Mother Higher Job Status			-0.011		
			(0.010)		
Parents not Married	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.028	0.087***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Household Size	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.019**	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Father Age	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.002***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother Age	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents	0.042***	0.042***	0.041***	0.058***	0.054***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Father Religion: Muslim	-0.096***	-0.096***	-0.094***	-0.119***	-0.303***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Father Religion: Minority	0.465***	0.465***	0.467***	0.459***	0.505***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.021)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.092***	0.093***	0.091***	0.098***	0.770***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.001)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.169***	-0.169***	-0.169***	-0.170***	-0.149***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.024)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.011	-0.011	-0.012	-0.011	-0.036
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Family Education: GCE A Level	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	0.006	0.024
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Family Education: GCSE	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	0.048**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.021)
Family Education: Level 1	0.090*	0.090*	0.088*	0.055	0.082
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.068)
Family Education: Other	0.170***	0.170***	0.167***	0.236***	0.544***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.107)
Family Education: None	0.014	0.014	0.014	-0.005	0.037
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.046)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.030	0.031	0.030	0.022	-0.057**

Table A.6: Robustness Checks (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	0.045**	0.046**	0.043**	0.042*	-0.040*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.134***	0.134***	0.131***	0.130***	0.059
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.043)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.059	0.059	0.056	0.060*	-0.049
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.148***	0.148***	0.143***	0.156***	0.108***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.172***	0.172***	0.167***	0.184***	0.144**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.057)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.242***	0.242***	0.240***	0.145***	
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.016)	
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.035**	0.036**	0.039**	0.035*	0.044***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	0.075***	0.075***	0.079***	0.072***	0.128***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.038)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	0.112***	0.113***	0.117***	0.139***	0.132***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.034)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.051***	0.051***	0.055**	0.031	0.027
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.086***	0.086***	0.092***	0.087**	0.085**
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.086***	0.087***	0.094***	0.095***	0.159***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.053)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.125***	0.126***	0.131***	0.032	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.036)	
IDACI score	-0.450***	-0.451***	-0.452***	-0.757***	-0.932***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.125)	(0.166)
IMD rank	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.008***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	-0.085***	-0.085***	-0.084***	-0.057***	-0.075***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	-0.227***	-0.227***	-0.228***	-0.218***	-0.193***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	-0.158***	-0.158***	-0.160***	-0.120***	0.448***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.061)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	-0.226***	-0.226***	-0.227***	-0.186***	
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.009)	
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	-0.205***	-0.205***	-0.207***	-0.211***	-0.179***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.067***	0.066***	0.064***	0.105***	0.084***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.002)
Child Ethnicity: Other	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.011	-0.052*
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.031)

Table A.6: Robustness Checks (Probit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religion Important to Child	0.083***	0.083***	0.083***	0.086***	0.036*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Child Religion: Muslim	0.104*	0.104*	0.103*	0.093***	
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.034)	
Child Religion: Minority	-0.031	-0.031	-0.031	-0.025	-0.064**
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.026)
Child Birth Weight	-0.021*	-0.021*	-0.021*	-0.008	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Child has SEN statement	0.067***	0.067***	0.068***	0.089***	0.080***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Child has Disability	0.054*	0.054	0.055*	0.003	0.038
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.050)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.022	-0.025
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.074)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.148***	-0.121**
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Curfew: Always	0.098**	0.098**	0.097**	0.106**	0.133
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.093)
Family Evenings: Often	0.012	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.118
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.092)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.041	0.041	0.039	0.053	0.149
	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.129)
Talk About School: Often	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,486	1,125
Pseudo-R^2	0.0856	0.0856	0.0857	0.0929	0.112

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.7: Robustness Checks (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Modern Family	-0.018***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.023***	-0.078***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Female	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.138***	-0.153***	-0.152***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Modern Family×Female	0.067***	0.067***	0.068***	0.089***	0.216***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.054)
Father Employment: Stable	-0.077**	-0.077**	-0.078**	-0.003	-0.045
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.059)
Mother Employment: Stable	0.102***	0.101***	0.102***	0.055	-0.078
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.249)
Mother More Educated		-0.005			
		(0.008)			
Mother Higher Job Status			-0.011		
			(0.009)		
Parents not Married	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.024	0.078***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Household Size	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.019**	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Father Age	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother Age	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents	0.041***	0.041***	0.041***	0.057***	0.054***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Father Religion: Muslim	-0.085***	-0.085***	-0.083***	-0.104***	-0.324***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Father Religion: Minority	0.481***	0.481***	0.482***	0.477***	0.533***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.021)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.096***	0.098***	0.095***	0.100***	0.796***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.003)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.167***	-0.167***	-0.167***	-0.167***	-0.150***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.007	-0.006	-0.008	-0.008	-0.031
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.032)
Family Education: GCE A Level	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.007	0.026
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Family Education: GCSE	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.033	0.047**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Family Education: Level 1	0.091*	0.092*	0.090	0.058	0.085
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.068)
Family Education: Other	0.171***	0.172***	0.168***	0.240***	0.552***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.100)
Family Education: None	0.018	0.017	0.018	-0.001	0.035
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.049)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.024	-0.049***

Table A.7: Robustness Checks (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	0.049**	0.049**	0.047**	0.046**	-0.035*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.134***	0.134***	0.131***	0.131***	0.062
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.046)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.064*	0.064*	0.061	0.068**	-0.035
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.042)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.153***	0.153***	0.148***	0.162***	0.118***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.173***	0.172***	0.167***	0.187***	0.153**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.059)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.247***	0.247***	0.245***	0.147***	
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.016)	
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.034*	0.035*	0.037*	0.033*	0.038**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	0.079***	0.080***	0.084***	0.075***	0.132***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	0.112***	0.114***	0.117***	0.139***	0.132***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.052**	0.053***	0.057**	0.031	0.023
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.088***	0.089***	0.093***	0.089**	0.085**
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.085***	0.087***	0.093***	0.094***	0.154***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.056)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.126***	0.127***	0.132***	0.029	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.038)	
IDACI score	-0.443***	-0.445***	-0.445***	-0.749***	-0.926***
	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.125)	(0.183)
IMD rank	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.008***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.087***	-0.058***	-0.069***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	-0.217***	-0.218***	-0.219***	-0.208***	-0.184***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	-0.153***	-0.153***	-0.155***	-0.115***	0.446***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.061)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	-0.214***	-0.214***	-0.216***	-0.177***	
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.009)	
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	-0.190***	-0.190***	-0.191***	-0.193***	-0.165***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.068***	0.067***	0.065***	0.106***	0.075***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.004)
Child Ethnicity: Other	-0.006	-0.007	-0.009	-0.021	-0.054**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.027)

Table A.7: Robustness Checks (Logit). Dependent Var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religion Important to Child	0.084***	0.084***	0.084***	0.086***	0.033
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.021)
Child Religion: Muslim	0.097*	0.095*	0.096*	0.086***	
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.029)	
Child Religion: Minority	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-0.027	-0.067***
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.021)
Child Birth Weight	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Child has SEN statement	0.070***	0.070***	0.070***	0.091***	0.082***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Child has Disability	0.054	0.054	0.055*	0.001	0.035
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.051)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.020	-0.018
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.073)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.143***	-0.113**
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Curfew: Always	0.096**	0.096**	0.095**	0.104**	0.125
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.089)
Family Evenings: Often	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.011	0.118
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.092)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.042	0.042	0.041	0.057	0.165
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.152)
Talk About School: Often	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.009	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,486	1,125
Pseudo-R^2	0.0854	0.0854	0.0854	0.0927	0.112

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.8: Other Outcomes: Believe High Wage Important

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.025*	0.026*	0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Female	-0.047*	-0.051**	-0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Modern Family×Female	-0.069***	-0.080***	-0.084***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Father Employment: Stable	0.044	0.038	0.043
	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Mother Employment: Stable	-0.042	-0.072	-0.066
	(0.056)	(0.073)	(0.079)
Parents not Married	0.059**	0.067***	0.062***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Household Size	-0.010	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Father Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mother Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents	-0.010	-0.010	-0.008
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Father Religion: Muslim	0.273***	0.280***	0.265***
	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Father Religion: Minority	-0.027	-0.031	-0.034
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.083)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.002	0.089*	0.089*
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.037	-0.043	-0.037
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.101***	-0.112***	-0.111***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Family Education: GCE A Level	0.004	0.001	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Family Education: GCSE	0.001	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Family Education: Level 1	0.053**	0.069***	0.074***
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Family Education: Other	0.056	0.070	0.075
	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Family Education: None	-0.056***	-0.076***	-0.070***
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	-0.055	-0.058	-0.059
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	0.034	0.038	0.037
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.069	0.074	0.080

Table A.8: Other Outcomes: Believe High Wage Important

	LPM	Probit	Logit
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	-0.059	-0.068	-0.071
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.032	0.038	0.036
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.034	0.037	0.039
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.052	-0.065**	-0.063**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.021	0.016	0.015
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	0.133***	0.133***	0.127***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	0.124	0.118	0.115
	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.076*	0.068**	0.070**
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.060**	0.051**	0.048**
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.102***	0.104***	0.099***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	0.086***	0.077***	0.078***
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.012)
IDACI score	0.137**	0.128*	0.150**
	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.066)
IMD rank	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	0.136***	0.134***	0.128***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	0.229***	0.219***	0.219***
	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	0.110***	0.080***	0.090***
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	0.214***	0.182***	0.185***
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	0.204***	0.186***	0.179***
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.278***	0.252***	0.236***
	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Child Ethnicity: Other	0.068**	0.054***	0.063***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Religion Important to Child	-0.039***	-0.045***	-0.048***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Child Religion: Muslim	-0.235***	-0.402***	-0.411***
	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.048)

Table A.8: Other Outcomes: Believe High Wage Important

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Child Religion: Minority	0.091***	0.093***	0.089***
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Child Birth Weight	0.028*	0.026*	0.028*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Child has SEN statement	-0.014	-0.014	-0.016
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Child has Disability	-0.084***	-0.091***	-0.090***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.146***	-0.162***	-0.163***
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.052	-0.077**	-0.090**
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Curfew: Always	0.015	0.023	0.021
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.165***	-0.260***	-0.253***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.150***	-0.324***	-0.344***
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Talk About School: Often	0.012	0.012	0.014
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.579***		
	(0.120)		
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.124	0.0923	0.0923

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.9: Other Outcomes: Want to Study Science

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.093**	0.114***	0.118***
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Female	-0.063**	-0.070***	-0.072***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Modern Family×Female	-0.179**	-0.201***	-0.195***
	(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Father Employment: Stable	0.051	0.066	0.045
	(0.326)	(0.342)	(0.420)
Mother Employment: Stable	-0.061	-0.096	-0.106
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.093)
Parents not Married	-0.109	-0.135	-0.135
	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Household Size	0.000	0.003	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Father Age	-0.005*	-0.007**	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother Age	0.003**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents	0.011	0.021	0.026*
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Father Religion: Muslim	-0.954***	-0.623***	-0.728***
	(0.108)	(0.012)	(0.029)
Father Religion: Minority	-0.337***	-0.379***	-0.381***
	(0.096)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.451**	0.468***	0.448***
	(0.151)	(0.139)	(0.129)
Mother Religion: Minority	0.044	0.048	0.047
	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.085)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.019	-0.015	-0.011
	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.092)
Family Education: GCE A Level	-0.069	-0.075	-0.070
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Family Education: GCSE	-0.114*	-0.114*	-0.122**
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Family Education: Level 1	-0.243**	-0.235***	-0.250***
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.054)
Family Education: Other	-0.087	-0.111	-0.113
	(0.086)	(0.118)	(0.113)
Family Education: None	0.013	0.035	0.033
	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.003	0.021	0.019
	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	-0.066	-0.071	-0.073
	(0.110)	(0.132)	(0.148)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.010	0.008	0.006

Table A.9: Other Outcomes: Want to Study Science

	LPM	Probit	Logit
	(0.120)	(0.145)	(0.150)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.077***	0.108***	0.109***
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.021	0.041	0.037
	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.116)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.117	0.159	0.167
	(0.106)	(0.128)	(0.134)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.001	0.002	0.008
	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	-0.088*	-0.101***	-0.095***
	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	-0.195***	-0.210***	-0.204***
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	-0.014	-0.013	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	-0.146***	-0.161***	-0.159***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	-0.184*	-0.189**	-0.191**
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.096)
Mother Social Class: Routine	-0.102**	-0.113***	-0.109***
	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.308***	-0.300***	-0.288***
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.024)
IDACI score	-0.187	-0.237	-0.203
	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.141)
IMD rank	0.006**	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	-0.033**	-0.045**	-0.035
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	0.489***	0.577***	0.595***
	(0.110)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	0.350**	0.419***	0.445***
	(0.109)	(0.084)	(0.091)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	0.556***	0.538***	0.548***
	(0.109)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	-0.030	-0.010	-0.018
	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.057)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.369***	0.417***	0.425***
	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Child Ethnicity: Other	0.221	0.297*	0.328*
	(0.175)	(0.156)	(0.187)
Religion Important to Child	-0.065	-0.088	-0.089
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Child Religion: Muslim	0.424***	0.743***	0.830***
	(0.115)	(0.015)	(0.017)

Table A.9: Other Outcomes: Want to Study Science

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Child Religion: Minority	-0.123*	-0.129**	-0.118**
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Child Birth Weight	-0.058	-0.073*	-0.075
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Child has SEN statement	0.006	0.028	0.031
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.048)
Child has Disability	-0.136	-0.131	-0.151**
	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.074)
Family Evenings: Often	0.064	0.069	0.082
	(0.111)	(0.129)	(0.163)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.209	-0.329**	-0.316*
	(0.200)	(0.165)	(0.186)
Curfew: Always	0.109	0.122*	0.128*
	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Family Evenings: Often	0.057	0.099***	0.093***
	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.017	0.047	0.028
	(0.037)	(0.077)	(0.089)
Talk About School: Often	-0.029	-0.046*	-0.048*
	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.043		
	(0.548)		
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.208	0.151	0.151

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.10: Dependent Var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.088***	0.091***	0.092***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Modern Family×Female	-0.158***	-0.153***	-0.153***
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Father Employment: Stable	0.101	0.104	0.111
	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.143)
Mother Employment: Stable	0.088	0.089	0.089
	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.095)
Parents not Married	-0.020	-0.021	-0.023
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Household Size	0.007	0.008	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Father Age	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother Age	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Religion Important to Parents	0.006	0.007	0.009
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Father Religion: Muslim	-0.016	-0.017	-0.024
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Father Religion: Minority	-0.180***	-0.173***	-0.170***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.142***	0.114***	0.150***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.117***	-0.125***	-0.125***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Family Education: Below Degree	0.009	0.009	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Family Education: GCE A Level	-0.049***	-0.053***	-0.055***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Family Education: GCSE	-0.054*	-0.058**	-0.060**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Family Education: Level 1	-0.095**	-0.093***	-0.094***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Family Education: Other	-0.002	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Family Education: None	-0.029	-0.028	-0.032*
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	-0.023	-0.019	-0.020
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	-0.007	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	0.009	0.012	0.015

Table A.10: Dependent Var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	LPM	Probit	Logit
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.023	0.030	0.031
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	-0.090***	-0.091***	-0.091***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Father Social Class: Routine	-0.120***	-0.121***	-0.119***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.037	-0.031	-0.034
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	-0.016	-0.014	-0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	-0.039	-0.037	-0.036
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	-0.050***	-0.052***	-0.052***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.002	0.004	0.006
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.010	0.014	0.014
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.006	0.005	0.007
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.014	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
IDACI score	-0.272**	-0.297***	-0.291***
	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.087)
IMD rank	0.002	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	0.151***	0.165***	0.164***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	0.397***	0.417***	0.418***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.052)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	0.074*	0.087**	0.086*
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	0.241***	0.260***	0.264***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	0.057*	0.055*	0.058**
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.179***	0.180***	0.193***
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Child Ethnicity: Other	0.158***	0.174***	0.177***
	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Religion Important to Child	0.027**	0.029***	0.027***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Child Religion: Muslim	-0.299***	-0.235***	-0.243***
	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.033)

Table A.10: Dependent Var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Child Religion: Minority	-0.023	-0.024	-0.020
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Child Birth Weight	-0.060***	-0.064***	-0.064***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Child has SEN statement	0.014	0.017	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Child has Disability	-0.017	-0.013	-0.020
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.042	-0.043	-0.049
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.045	0.050	0.046
	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Curfew: Always	-0.039	-0.040	-0.042
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.064	-0.074	-0.070
	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.102*	-0.110**	-0.107**
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Talk About School: Often	0.045***	0.048***	0.050***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	1.866***		
	(0.107)		
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.094	0.0611	0.0610

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.11: Dependent Var: Argue Often with Parents

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Modern Family	0.029	0.034	0.036
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Female	0.017	0.019	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Modern Family×Female	0.033***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Father Employment: Stable	0.124*	0.133**	0.133**
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Mother Employment: Stable	-0.124***	-0.131***	-0.125***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Parents not Married	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Household Size	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Father Age	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mother Age	-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Religion Important to Parents	0.024	0.028	0.027
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Father Religion: Muslim	0.194**	0.189***	0.194***
	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Father Religion: Minority	0.104*	0.104**	0.109**
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Mother Religion: Muslim	0.229***	0.229***	0.220***
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Mother Religion: Minority	-0.041	-0.043	-0.045
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Family Education: Below Degree	-0.033	-0.035	-0.035
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Family Education: GCE A Level	0.017	0.019	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Family Education: GCSE	-0.065	-0.069	-0.070
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Family Education: Level 1	-0.008	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Family Education: Other	0.117	0.114*	0.119*
	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Family Education: None	-0.082*	-0.092**	-0.092**
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.	0.083	0.081	0.083
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Father Social Class: Intermediate	0.089*	0.086**	0.088**
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Father Social Class: Small Employer	-0.019	-0.023	-0.022

Table A.11: Dependent Var: Argue Often with Parents

	LPM	Probit	Logit
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor	0.082*	0.076*	0.080**
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine	0.117**	0.114***	0.116***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Father Social Class: Routine	0.097***	0.094***	0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.023	-0.034*	-0.030
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.	-0.068	-0.070*	-0.073*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate	0.040	0.044	0.044
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer	-0.015	-0.015	-0.017
	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor	-0.018	-0.018	-0.020
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine	-0.025	-0.025	-0.027
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Mother Social Class: Routine	0.061**	0.064***	0.065***
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e	-0.123**	-0.135**	-0.139**
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.056)
IDACI score	0.194	0.202	0.212
	(0.123)	(0.139)	(0.133)
IMD rank	-0.003**	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed	0.073***	0.081***	0.080***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Child Ethnicity: Indian	-0.156***	-0.163***	-0.171***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani	-0.267***	-0.285***	-0.295***
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi	-0.576***	-0.533***	-0.533***
	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean	-0.076***	-0.082***	-0.081***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Child Ethnicity: Black African	0.122***	0.139***	0.130***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Child Ethnicity: Other	-0.085**	-0.091***	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Religion Important to Child	-0.089***	-0.095***	-0.095***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Child Religion: Muslim	-0.217*	-0.253***	-0.255**
	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.099)

Table A.11: Dependent Var: Argue Often with Parents

	LPM	Probit	Logit
Child Religion: Minority	-0.038	-0.040*	-0.041*
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Child Birth Weight	-0.020	-0.021**	-0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Child has SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Child has Disability	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Family Evenings: Often	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	-0.114	-0.122*	-0.130*
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Curfew: Always	0.056	0.060	0.061
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Family Evenings: Often	0.132***	0.140***	0.141***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Family Evenings: Sometimes	0.105	0.106**	0.104**
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Talk About School: Often	-0.021	-0.024*	-0.024*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	1.685***		
	(0.262)		
Region Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,486	1,486	1,486
R^2/Pseudo-R^2	0.081	0.0573	0.0572

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.12: RD Results (Males). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	-0.119**	-0.063	-0.056	-0.164***	-0.160**	-0.145**
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.065)	(0.057)
Mother's Share	-0.275***	0.295	-0.110	-0.109	0.095	0.360
	(0.068)	(0.207)	(0.512)	(0.095)	(0.313)	(0.633)
Modern Family×Mother's Share	0.964***	-1.573	-0.804	0.730***	0.138	-0.997
	(0.143)	(1.133)	(1.130)	(0.153)	(1.228)	(2.317)
Mother's Share^2		1.007**	-0.879		0.374	1.647
		(0.326)	(2.855)		(0.445)	(3.487)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^2		2.614	2.399		0.352	4.185
		(2.070)	(5.083)		(2.426)	(11.760)
Mother's Share^3			-2.319			1.602
			(3.773)			(4.650)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^3			5.169			-8.583
			(7.486)			(19.027)
Father's Employment: Stable				-0.075	-0.076	-0.077
				(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.242)
Mother's Employment: Stable				0.226	0.231	0.229
				(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.130)
Parents not Married				0.024	0.023	0.023
				(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Household Size				0.013	0.012	0.012
				(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Father Age				0.008	0.008	0.008
				(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mother Age				-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Religion Important to Parents				0.085***	0.086***	0.087***
				(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Father Religion: Muslim				0.105	0.111	0.114
				(0.332)	(0.339)	(0.342)
Father Religion: Minority				0.567***	0.562***	0.562***
				(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.102	0.096	0.092
				(0.334)	(0.339)	(0.343)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.161***	-0.159***	-0.160***
				(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Family Education: Below Degree				0.001	0.001	0.001
				(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Family Education: GCE A Level				-0.025	-0.026	-0.026
				(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Family Education: GCSE				0.036	0.034	0.034
				(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Family Education: Level 1				0.131	0.127	0.128
				(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.131)
Family Education: Other				0.230***	0.227***	0.229***

Table A.12: RD Results (Males). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Family Education: None				-0.105	-0.108	-0.107
				(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.029	0.027	0.025
				(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.002	0.003	0.001
				(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.106)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				-0.031	-0.031	-0.036
				(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.102)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.028	0.030	0.028
				(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.122	0.122	0.119
				(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.094	0.093	0.092
				(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.157	0.151	0.151
				(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.123)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.027	0.028	0.028
				(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.070	0.069	0.070
				(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.131**	0.130**	0.129**
				(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.072	0.073	0.075
				(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.151	0.152	0.153
				(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.109)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.058	0.057	0.060
				(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				-0.053	-0.059	-0.055
				(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.098)
IDACI score				-0.623**	-0.618**	-0.616**
				(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.208)
IMD rank				0.007*	0.007*	0.007*
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				-0.232**	-0.230*	-0.230*
				(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.465***	-0.467***	-0.466***
				(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.259	-0.261	-0.260
				(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.218)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.270*	-0.272*	-0.271*
				(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.051	-0.051	-0.052
				(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.189)

Table A.12: RD Results (Males). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				-0.007	-0.008	-0.006
				(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Child Ethnicity: Other				-0.154	-0.157	-0.158
				(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Religion Important to Child				0.082	0.081	0.081
				(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.008	-0.005	-0.006
				(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Child Birth Weight				0.000	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Child has SEN statement				0.061	0.060	0.059
				(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Child has Disability				0.052	0.050	0.052
				(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.081)
Family Evenings: Often				0.036	0.034	0.033
				(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.096)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.097	-0.096	-0.094
				(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.108)
Curfew: Always				0.128	0.128	0.128
				(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.052	-0.051	-0.050
				(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				0.069	0.069	0.071
				(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Talk About School: Often				0.030	0.030	0.030
				(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Constant	0.309***	0.364***	0.346***	0.457	0.471*	0.486
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.265)	(0.252)	(0.272)
Region Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Observations	708	708	708	708	708	708
R^2	0.020	0.025	0.025	0.155	0.156	0.156

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.13: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	0.133*	0.162***	0.261**	0.187**	0.208***	0.321**
	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.100)
Mother's Share	-0.232***	-0.173*	-0.125	-0.140**	-0.268	-0.686
	(0.033)	(0.083)	(0.494)	(0.057)	(0.211)	(0.586)
Modern Family×Mother's Share	0.136	-0.500	-3.869	-0.246	-0.283	-2.962
	(0.130)	(1.196)	(3.510)	(0.186)	(1.013)	(3.403)
Mother's Share^2		0.104	0.330		-0.232	-2.233
		(0.175)	(2.218)		(0.450)	(2.522)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^2		0.970	18.968		0.535	19.595
		(2.291)	(17.492)		(1.944)	(18.061)
Mother's Share^3			0.279			-2.509
			(2.588)			(2.853)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^3			-24.365			-20.090
			(21.943)			(22.557)
Father's Employment: Stable				0.064	0.063	0.055
				(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.141)
Mother's Employment: Stable				-0.112	-0.109	-0.113
				(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Parents not Married				0.006	0.005	0.003
				(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Household Size				0.017	0.018	0.018
				(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Father Age				-0.004	-0.005	-0.004
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Mother Age				0.001	0.001	0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents				0.023	0.023	0.021
				(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Father Religion: Muslim				-0.332**	-0.330**	-0.330**
				(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Father Religion: Minority				0.291	0.288	0.297
				(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.178)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.220	0.219	0.228
				(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.225)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.150***	-0.150***	-0.146***
				(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.029	-0.029	-0.031
				(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Family Education: GCE A Level				0.020	0.020	0.021
				(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Family Education: GCSE				0.005	0.005	0.006
				(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Family Education: Level 1				-0.051	-0.050	-0.052
				(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Family Education: Other				0.173	0.177	0.176

Table A.13: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				(0.184)	(0.179)	(0.177)
Family Education: None				0.093	0.095	0.090
				(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.006	0.005	0.000
				(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.055	0.052	0.047
				(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				0.301***	0.302***	0.297***
				(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.043	0.042	0.037
				(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.121	0.118	0.113
				(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.188**	0.186**	0.184**
				(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				-0.009	-0.008	-0.013
				(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.030	0.031	0.032
				(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.042	0.042	0.043
				(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.103	0.105	0.106
				(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.006	0.007	0.008
				(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				-0.003	-0.001	-0.002
				(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.091)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.127	0.129	0.119
				(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.084)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.013	0.015	0.016
				(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.068)
IDACI score				-0.674**	-0.672**	-0.692**
				(0.273)	(0.277)	(0.271)
IMD rank				0.006	0.006	0.006
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				0.096	0.097	0.086
				(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.135)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.169	-0.166	-0.178
				(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.125)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.098	-0.096	-0.111
				(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.164)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.255**	-0.253**	-0.263**
				(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.086)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.207***	-0.205***	-0.224***
				(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.052)

Table A.13: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Traditional Norm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.484	0.485	0.492
				(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.296)
Child Ethnicity: Other				0.072	0.076	0.063
				(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Religion Important to Child				0.120**	0.119**	0.124**
				(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Child Religion: Muslim				0.135	0.134	0.132
				(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.039	-0.038	-0.041
				(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Child Birth Weight				-0.027	-0.027	-0.025
				(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Child has SEN statement				0.120**	0.120**	0.116**
				(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Child has Disability				-0.025	-0.024	-0.026
				(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.088)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.016	-0.017	-0.020
				(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.092)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.180	-0.181	-0.177
				(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Curfew: Always				0.104**	0.103**	0.106**
				(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Family Evenings: Often				0.055	0.055	0.054
				(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.145)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				0.048	0.047	0.043
				(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.143)
Talk About School: Often				-0.045	-0.044	-0.045
				(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Constant	0.171***	0.177***	0.179***	0.185	0.184	0.165
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.339)	(0.341)	(0.348)
Region Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Observations	779	779	779	779	779	779
R^2	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.168	0.168	0.170

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.14: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	-0.313***	-0.356***	-0.334***	-0.305***	-0.328***	-0.382***
	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.041)	(0.094)	(0.097)
Mother's Share	0.202***	0.437	1.057	0.178**	-0.238	1.440
	(0.040)	(0.544)	(0.836)	(0.060)	(0.876)	(0.964)
Modern Family×Mother's Share	0.665***	0.778	-1.449	0.607***	2.060	-0.205
	(0.075)	(1.039)	(2.453)	(0.184)	(1.243)	(2.811)
Mother's Share^2		0.422	3.317		-0.775	7.236*
		(0.973)	(4.021)		(1.554)	(3.812)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^2		-1.070	4.855		-1.189	-5.934
		(1.880)	(13.479)		(2.274)	(15.726)
Mother's Share^3			3.583			10.057*
			(5.275)			(4.816)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^3			-15.240			-14.455
			(18.229)			(21.640)
Father's Employment: Stable				0.092	0.090	0.093
				(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.067)
Mother's Employment: Stable				0.321	0.320	0.329
				(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.204)
Parents not Married				-0.042	-0.044	-0.032
				(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.080)
Household Size				0.005	0.004	0.004
				(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Father Age				-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Mother Age				-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Religion Important to Parents				0.027	0.028	0.029
				(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Father Religion: Muslim				0.397*	0.396*	0.388*
				(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.182)
Father Religion: Minority				-0.209	-0.204	-0.212
				(0.176)	(0.168)	(0.163)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.007	0.029	0.029
				(0.343)	(0.346)	(0.351)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.144**	-0.144**	-0.145**
				(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.016	-0.022	-0.022
				(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Family Education: GCE A Level				-0.088	-0.086	-0.085
				(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Family Education: GCSE				-0.103	-0.106	-0.104
				(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Family Education: Level 1				-0.076	-0.077	-0.066
				(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Family Education: Other				0.072	0.071	0.071

Table A.14: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Family Education: None				-0.077	-0.076	-0.082
				(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.137)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				-0.040	-0.036	-0.033
				(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.034	0.032	0.030
				(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				-0.010	0.002	-0.009
				(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.049	0.051	0.050
				(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				-0.025	-0.025	-0.029
				(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Father Social Class: Routine				-0.110**	-0.101**	-0.106*
				(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.125	0.151	0.166
				(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.104)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.000	0.002	0.007
				(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				-0.000	0.000	0.002
				(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				-0.064	-0.069	-0.072
				(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.105)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.034	0.030	0.032
				(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.057	0.056	0.062
				(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Mother Social Class: Routine				-0.076	-0.078	-0.072
				(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.024	0.043	0.061
				(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.068)
IDACI score				-0.385	-0.400	-0.382
				(0.302)	(0.297)	(0.295)
IMD rank				0.003	0.003	0.003
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				0.152	0.165	0.167
				(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				0.491***	0.500***	0.507***
				(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.125)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				0.070	0.068	0.078
				(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				0.165	0.168	0.169
				(0.172)	(0.179)	(0.180)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				0.023	0.021	0.006
				(0.121)	(0.130)	(0.147)

Table A.14: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Parents Chose GCSE Subjects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.073	0.092	0.087
				(0.209)	(0.217)	(0.218)
Child Ethnicity: Other				0.303**	0.310*	0.314*
				(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Religion Important to Child				0.102*	0.098*	0.101*
				(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Child Religion: Muslim				-0.619***	-0.633***	-0.630***
				(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Child Religion: Minority				-0.040	-0.044	-0.042
				(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Child Birth Weight				-0.052**	-0.053**	-0.053**
				(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Child has SEN statement				0.090	0.086	0.083
				(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Child has Disability				0.094	0.095	0.089
				(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.125	-0.128	-0.118
				(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.058	-0.066	-0.049
				(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.071)
Curfew: Always				-0.178	-0.173	-0.169
				(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.099	-0.100	-0.108
				(0.179)	(0.181)	(0.176)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.140	-0.139	-0.146
				(0.158)	(0.164)	(0.162)
Talk About School: Often				0.025	0.023	0.019
				(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Constant	0.424***	0.446***	0.474***	-0.830*	-0.823	-0.728
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.449)	(0.454)	(0.463)
Region Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Observations	779	779	779	779	779	779
R^2	0.023	0.024	0.025	0.159	0.161	0.163

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.

Table A.15: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Argue Often with Parents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Modern Family	0.105**	0.247***	0.153**	0.147***	0.229***	0.161*
	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.079)
Mother's Share	-0.056	-1.102***	-0.057	-0.063	-0.670**	0.434
	(0.127)	(0.154)	(0.457)	(0.126)	(0.233)	(0.459)
Modern Family×Mother's Share	-0.282*	0.043	0.527	-0.144	-0.030	-0.480
	(0.133)	(0.290)	(1.921)	(0.156)	(0.550)	(2.277)
Mother's Share^2		-1.886***	2.996		-1.105**	4.157
		(0.273)	(2.459)		(0.342)	(2.390)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^2		3.222***	-10.145		2.001	-6.904
		(0.526)	(11.128)		(1.230)	(16.037)
Mother's Share^3			6.051*			6.599*
			(3.228)			(3.255)
Modern Family×Mother's Share^3			5.222			-1.774
			(15.019)			(17.855)
Father's Employment: Stable				0.044	0.041	0.045
				(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.195)
Mother's Employment: Stable				-0.023	-0.010	-0.004
				(0.252)	(0.258)	(0.260)
Parents not Married				-0.016	-0.018	-0.011
				(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.092)
Household Size				-0.028**	-0.027*	-0.027*
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Father Age				-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mother Age				-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religion Important to Parents				0.078**	0.076**	0.077**
				(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Father Religion: Muslim				0.377	0.401	0.395
				(0.325)	(0.291)	(0.290)
Father Religion: Minority				0.098	0.089	0.082
				(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.149)
Mother Religion: Muslim				0.185	0.182	0.178
				(0.383)	(0.370)	(0.365)
Mother Religion: Minority				-0.037	-0.037	-0.039
				(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)
Family Education: Below Degree				-0.042	-0.044	-0.044
				(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Family Education: GCE A Level				0.080	0.079	0.079
				(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Family Education: GCSE				-0.058	-0.062	-0.061
				(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Family Education: Level 1				0.084	0.086	0.092
				(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Family Education: Other				0.221	0.237	0.238

Table A.15: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Argue Often with Parents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				(0.201)	(0.207)	(0.207)
Family Education: None				-0.123	-0.120	-0.123
				(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.122)
Father Social Class: Lower Mang.				0.156*	0.153	0.156*
				(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Father Social Class: Intermediate				0.179*	0.167*	0.166*
				(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.083)
Father Social Class: Small Employer				0.130	0.134	0.129
				(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Father Social Class: Lower Supervisor				0.069	0.064	0.065
				(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.106)
Father Social Class: Semi-Routine				0.235**	0.223**	0.223**
				(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.079)
Father Social Class: Routine				0.220*	0.215*	0.212*
				(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Father Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.080	0.090	0.100
				(0.109)	(0.097)	(0.086)
Mother Social Class: Lower Mang.				-0.036	-0.030	-0.028
				(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Mother Social Class: Intermediate				0.058	0.060	0.061
				(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Mother Social Class: Small Employer				0.088	0.095	0.092
				(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Mother Social Class: Lower Supervisor				-0.022	-0.018	-0.017
				(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Mother Social Class: Semi-Routine				-0.032	-0.026	-0.023
				(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Mother Social Class: Routine				0.041	0.047	0.055
				(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.102)
Mother Social Class: Long-Term u/e				0.084	0.094	0.103
				(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.163)
IDACI score				0.255	0.259	0.274
				(0.290)	(0.301)	(0.297)
IMD rank				-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Child Ethnicity: Mixed				0.031	0.037	0.041
				(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Child Ethnicity: Indian				-0.328**	-0.315*	-0.307*
				(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.137)
Child Ethnicity: Pakistani				-0.462***	-0.457***	-0.444***
				(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.075)
Child Ethnicity: Bangladeshi				-0.717***	-0.708***	-0.705***
				(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.137)
Child Ethnicity: Black Caribbean				-0.243	-0.236	-0.238
				(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.174)

Table A.15: RD Results (Females). Dependent var: Argue Often with Parents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child Ethnicity: Black African				0.225	0.230	0.224
				(0.293)	(0.302)	(0.302)
Child Ethnicity: Other				-0.184	-0.170	-0.164
				(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.141)
Religion Important to Child				-0.105	-0.109	-0.109
				(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Child Religion: Muslim				-0.380**	-0.396**	-0.392**
				(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Child Religion: Minority				0.057	0.058	0.060
				(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Child Birth Weight				-0.011	-0.009	-0.010
				(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Child has SEN statement				-0.061	-0.061	-0.061
				(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Child has Disability				-0.068	-0.065	-0.066
				(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.079	-0.083	-0.077
				(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.016	-0.022	-0.012
				(0.146)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Curfew: Always				0.211**	0.208**	0.208**
				(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.086)
Family Evenings: Often				-0.045	-0.045	-0.048
				(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.176)
Family Evenings: Sometimes				-0.061	-0.064	-0.067
				(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.150)
Talk About School: Often				-0.092***	-0.091***	-0.093***
				(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.598***	0.499***	0.545***	1.013	1.006	1.063
	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.761)	(0.787)	(0.802)
Region Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Area Type Fixed Effects				✓	✓	✓
Observations	779	779	779	779	779	779
R^2	0.003	0.010	0.011	0.166	0.168	0.169

Robust standard errors (clustered by bin) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Notes: Base dummy variables are traditional family, male, father's employment unstable, mother's employment unstable, father has same or higher education, father has same or higher job status, parents are married, religion not important to parents, father's religion: none, mother's religion: none, family education: degree, father's social class: higher managerial/professional, mother's social class: higher managerial/professional, child's ethnicity: white, religion not important to child, child's religion: Christian, child does not have SEN status, child does not have disabilities, family evenings: never, curfew: rarely, family activities: never, talk about school: rarely.