Program > Papers by author > Chiambretto Anne-Sarah

On volontary conservation agreements in fisheries
Hubert Stahn  1, *@  , Anne-Sarah Chiambretto  1@  
1 : Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille  (GREQAM)  -  Website
Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II, Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS], CNRS : UMR7316, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
Centre de la Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02 -  France
* : Corresponding author

In this paper we investigate the possibility for governance authorities to avoid a large part of regulatory costs, by simply backing up social norms with a threat of collective punishment. Specifically, we consider the case of fisheries in which the regulatory cap is to sustain an optimal conservation level. We identify a mandatory regulation such that when it is used as a threat, it ensures that the cap is voluntarily implemented. The mandatory scheme is based on a incentive mechanism which nevertheless secure the returns of the harvester and a potential tax on the capacity. As a threat, this mandatory regulation takes however time to be enforced. We nevertheless show that this mechanism even if it is applied randomly after the first occurrence of a deviation of the optimal conservation level is for a suitable choice of the capacity tax able to ensure voluntary compliance.


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